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I. Introduction 
On June 11, 2013, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 
favor of Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., a broker-dealer, denying 
Vigilant Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss Bear Stearns’ 
complaint.1 In J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance 
Co.,2 Bear Stearns3 sought indemnification from Vigilant for 
approximately $140 million out of $160 million that Bear Stearns 
had paid to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as 
“disgorgement” in a settlement of market timing violations 
claims.4 Vigilant argued that, as a matter of public policy, Bear 
Stearns should not be entitled to indemnification for the $160 
million disgorgement payment “because Bear Stearns enabled its 
                                                                                                     
 1. See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 
(N.Y. 2013) (reversing and reinstating the insured’s complaint). 
 2. 992 N.E.2d 1076 (N.Y. 2013). 
 3. See id. at 1080 n.4 (“In 2008, Bear Stearns merged with J.P. Morgan. 
After the merger, Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. became J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. 
and Bear Stearns Securities Corp. was renamed J.P. Morgan Clearing Corp.”).  
 4. See id. at 1078–79 (providing the details of the SEC order issued after 
Bear Stearns agreed to pay $160 million as “disgorgement”). 
COVERAGE FOR ILL-GOTTEN GAINS? 1079 
customers to make millions through its trading tactics.”5 The 
court rejected the insurer’s public policy argument because Bear 
Stearns “did not share in the profits or benefits from the late 
trading, from which it received only $16.9 million in 
commissions.”6 Because the SEC order did not conclusively refute 
Bear Stearns’s allegations that approximately $140 million of the 
disgorgement payment represented the improper profits of its 
hedge fund customers, the insurers were not entitled to a 
dismissal of Bear Stearns’s coverage claim.7 Arguably, J.P. 
Morgan Securities Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co. narrows the 
ability of insurers to rely on the public policy rationale to deny 
coverage for claims or payments labeled as restitution or 
disgorgement. The rejection of the insurer’s public policy 
argument in J.P. Morgan Securities represents a potential victory 
for insureds if other courts follow suit in limiting the ability of 
insurance companies to rely on the public policy rationale. 
Deciding whether there is insurance coverage for restitution 
and disgorgement is especially problematic because the 
restitution remedy is subject to misunderstanding by both 
lawyers and judges.8 J.P. Morgan Securities highlights the 
uncertainty surrounding the meaning of disgorgement and how it 
should be measured.9 Courts must look at the nature of the claim 
                                                                                                     
 5. Id. at 1080. 
 6. Id. at 1078. 
 7. See id. at 1083 (“Hence, at this . . . stage, the documentary evidence 
does not decisively repudiate Bear Stearns’ allegation that the SEC 
disgorgement payment amount was calculated in large measure on the profits of 
others.”). 
 8. See Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating 
Restitution with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 973, 977 (2011) (discussing the confusion surrounding the 
restitution remedy); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c (2011) (“Employed to denote liability based on unjust 
enrichment, the word ‘restitution’ is a term of art that has frequently proved 
confusing.”); id. § 51 cmt. e (“While its purpose is easily stated and readily 
understandable, the application of the [disgorgement] remedy involves well-
known, sometimes intractable difficulties.”). 
 9. See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 922 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 
(N.Y. 2013) 
[Bear Stearns] acknowledges that it is reasonable to preclude an 
insured from obtaining indemnity for the disgorgement of its own ill-
gotten gains, but contends that it was not unjustly enriched by at 
least $140 million of the disgorgement payment because that portion 
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or payment, rather than the label, to see if it constitutes 
restitution or disgorgement.10 However, the problem remains that 
restitution and disgorgement are not specific terms with 
universal definitions.11 Thus, it is imperative for courts and 
lawyers to gain a sound understanding of what these terms mean 
in the vernacular of remedies. 
This Note explores the legal issues surrounding insurance 
coverage for restitutionary payments and disgorgement of ill-
gotten gains. Furthermore, this Note argues that utilizing and 
adopting the definitions of restitution and disgorgement from the 
Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment12 can 
provide guidance and clarity for both judges and lawyers in 
determining whether there is coverage for claims or payments 
labeled as restitution or disgorgement.13 Part II provides general 
background information, including an overview of director’s and 
officer’s liability insurance policies, the scope of coverage provided 
under such policies, and limitations on coverage, as well as an 
                                                                                                     
was attributable to the profits of its customers. 
In response to this argument, the insurer contends that, for public policy 
reasons, it should not be required to indemnify Bear Stearns for the $160 
million disgorgement payment “because Bear Stearns enabled its customers to 
make millions through its trading tactics.” Id. 
 10. See Pan Pac. Retail Props., Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 471 F.3d 961, 966 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“In deciding whether a certain remedy is insurable, we must look 
beyond the labels of the asserted claims or remedies.” (citation omitted)); 
Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“The label of ‘restitution’ or ‘damages’ does not dictate whether a loss is 
insurable.” (citations omitted)). 
 11. Compare William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13-1468, 2014 
WL 185388, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014) (finding that in order to constitute 
disgorgement, the hospital would have had to gain possession of, rather than 
retain, “the nurses’ wages illicitly, unlawfully, or unjustly” (emphasis added)), 
with Town of Brookhaven v. CNA Ins. Cos., No. CV-86-3569, 1988 WL 23555, at 
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1988) (requiring the town to disgorge the interest it earned 
on the unlawfully held funds, which represented “the benefit enjoyed by the 
town by virtue of its improper withholding of money [that] should have been 
earning interest on behalf of the districts”). 
 12. See generally  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT (2011). 
 13. See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining why adopting the definitions of 
restitution and disgorgement from the Third Restatement of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment can help courts gain a sound understanding of these 
remedies, which will help courts determine whether to grant coverage for 
restitution or disgorgement on a case-by-case basis). 
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overview of remedies.14 Part III addresses the controversies 
surrounding coverage for restitution and disgorgement and 
provides a discussion of recent problematic cases.15 Part IV 
reiterates the complicated nature of the issues related to the 
insurability of “restitution” and “disgorgement” and provides 
several suggested solutions to address these issues.16 The most 
promising solution lies in utilizing and adopting the definitions of 
restitution and disgorgement from the Third Restatement of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.17 The Note concludes by 
emphasizing the importance of courts having an understanding of 
the terms “restitution” and “disgorgement” as they are used in 
the vernacular of remedies. If courts adopted the Restatement’s 
definitions and utilized its guidance when analyzing coverage 
issues for these misunderstood remedies, then courts would be 
able to resolve these insurance coverage disputes with some sense 
of clarity. 
II. Background on Insurance Law 
A. Insurance Contracts 
Because events in life are uncertain, people and entities 
insure against risks that accompany various activities.18 
Although insurance has been defined in various ways, it is 
essentially “a contract by which one party (the insurer), for a 
consideration . . . promises to make a certain payment, usually of 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part II (providing background on insurance law and 
discussing the interpretation of insurance contracts). 
 15. See infra Part III (presenting the problem and discussing the applicable 
law in determining whether an insurer must indemnify its insured for payments 
that are restitutionary in nature). 
 16. See infra Part IV (proposing several potential solutions to address the 
issues surrounding the insurability of restitution and disgorgement). 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
(2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject 
to liability in restitution.”); id. § 51 cmt. a (“Restitution measured by the 
defendant’s wrongful gain is frequently called disgorgement.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 18. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 7 (5th ed. 2012) (defining insurance and discussing the nature 
of risk). 
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money, upon the destruction or injury of ‘something’ in which the 
other party (the insured) has an interest.”19 Two essential 
characteristics of an insurance contract are “the assumption of a 
risk of loss and the undertaking to indemnify the insured against 
such loss.”20 Insurance can be characterized as first-party or 
third-party insurance.21 In first-party insurance, the insurance 
contract “indemnifies the insured for a loss suffered directly by 
the insured,” whereas in third-party insurance, “the interests 
protected by the contract are ultimately those of third parties 
injured by the insured’s conduct.”22 
Liability insurance, which is the focus of this Note, is a 
quintessential example of third-party insurance because “it 
protects the insured against liability to others.”23 Of primary 
concern here is professional liability insurance, which “covers 
members of various professions, with both the premium and the 
articulation of coverage based on the specific profession 
involved.”24 Several different coverage options are available 
within professional liability insurance, including errors and 
omissions (E&O) coverage and directors and officers (D&O) 
liability coverage.25 Errors and omissions coverage protects 
“against liability based on the failure of the insured, in his or her 
professional status, to comply with what can be considered in 
simplistic terms to be the standard of care for that profession.”26  
Directors and officers liability coverage protects “against both 
liability based on official actions of corporate officers and 
directors, and the expense of defending actions that seek to 
establish liability.”27 A common D&O policy “offers 
indemnification to the corporation for loss arising from a claim 
made against an officer or director of the corporation acting in his 
                                                                                                     
 19. 1 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:6 (3d ed. 2013). 
 20. Id. § 1:9. 
 21. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 45. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 1:35. 
 25. See id. (providing that under modern practice two of the more common 
coverages within professional liability insurance are E&O coverage and D&O 
liability coverage). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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or her capacity as such.”28 To be within coverage, the officer or 
director must be sued as an officer or director of the corporation, 
and the alleged wrongful conduct must have occurred while the 
officer or director was discharging her corporate duties.29 
B. D&O Policies 
Most D&O policies offer three types of coverage: “Side-A,” 
“Side-B,” and “Side-C.”30 Side-A coverage protects individual 
directors and officers, typically providing that the insurer will 
indemnify directors and officers for loss resulting from any claim 
made against them for a wrongful act.31 Side-B coverage 
generally provides reimbursement to entities that indemnify 
individual directors and officers that are sued in their capacities 
as directors and officers.32 The corporate insured is generally not 
covered for its own losses as a defendant in litigation unless the 
policy provides “entity” coverage.33 The insured entity may choose 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. See 9A PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 131:31 (providing that a typical 
D&O policy “defines ‘director and officer’ to include any past, present, or future 
duly-elected or appointed director or officer of the company”). 
 30. See MICHAEL R. DAVISSON ET AL., DIRECTORS & OFFICERS LIABILITY 
INSURANCE DESKBOOK 29 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining three types of coverage 
included in most D&O policies). 
 31. See id. at 30 (providing a typical definition of Side-A coverage). 
 32. See id. at 29 (discussing the protection afforded under Side-B coverage). 
 33. See, e.g., Clark v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 951 F. Supp. 559, 561 (D.V.I. 
1997) (“These provisions have been interpreted to mean exactly what they 
purport to state, i.e. that the named insured is not covered except to the extent 
that it may indemnify its directors and officers for covered loss incurred by 
them.”); Farmers & Merchs. Bank v. Home Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 825, 829 (Ala. 
1987) (“The second insuring clause very plainly provides primary insurance 
coverage to the Bank to the extent the Bank has indemnified its officers and 
directors for covered losses incurred by those officers and directors.”); Nat’l 
Bank of Ariz. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 711, 715–16 (Ariz. 
1999) (“NBA’s directors and officers did not face any liability, thus NBA is not 
entitled to any coverage or reimbursement under its D & O Policy. To find 
coverage under NBA’s D & O Policy under these circumstances would be to 
transform it into a corporate liability policy.”); Buckingham Apartments, Ltd. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“The policy 
expressly limits recovery to those instances in which an officer or director is 
entitled to indemnification from the corporation, or where an officer or director 
is obligated to pay an amount based upon his legal liability for an actual or 
asserted wrongful act.”). 
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to obtain Side-C coverage, commonly referred to as “entity” 
coverage, for claims against the company itself, provided that the 
insurer offers such coverage.34 
C. Scope of Coverage 
In order for the insured to recover under a D&O or an E&O 
policy, the claim must be covered by the terms of the contract.35 
Therefore, to obtain coverage, an insured must make a claim that 
falls within the coverage provisions of a liability policy.36 
Ultimately, the court must determine “whether the claim falls 
within the policy’s scope of coverage.”37 Typically the concept that 
insured individuals “are covered only for actions taken in an 
insured capacity” is included in the definition of “director,” 
“officer,” or “wrongful acts.”38 In sum, determining whether the 
insurer will provide coverage under E&O and D&O policies 
hinges on whether a covered individual, in his or her insured 
capacity, has committed a negligent act, error, or omission during 
the coverage period.39 The term “wrongful acts” is typically 
defined to mean negligent, rather than intentional, conduct.40 
Most liability policies provide that “loss” does not include 
                                                                                                     
 34. See DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 36 (explaining that some D&O 
policies extend Side-C coverage and that “[s]uch coverage may be optional and 
extended only upon the payment of an additional premium”). 
 35. See 9 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 126:1 (providing that the insurance 
contract determines the extent of coverage under a given policy). 
 36. See id. (explaining that no recovery may be had for a claim that falls 
outside the coverage provisions or that falls within a policy exclusion). 
 37. See DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 63 (providing several important 
questions in determining the scope of coverage, such as “who is afforded 
coverage under the policy terms, and what manner of claims, wrongful acts or 
losses are covered under the policy?”). 
 38. See id. (noting that “D&O policies do not cover wrongful acts taken in a 
personal capacity or on behalf of an entity other than the insured”). 
 39. See 9A PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 131:1 (discussing protection 
afforded under E&O and D&O policies). 
 40. See Donald R. McMinn, Transactional Lawyers Under Fire: A Look at 
Coverage Questions Arising in the Context of Securities Class Action Suits 
Against Legal Professionals, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 999, 1002 (2003) 
(providing, for example, that policies covering an insured’s liability for “wrongful 
acts” will “define the term to mean acts that are negligent,” not acts that are 
intended to cause harm to a third party). 
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coverage for matters uninsurable under applicable law.41 
Insurance companies often use this limitation to deny coverage 
for claims that are restitutionary in nature.42 Along with explicit 
policy exclusions, courts and legislatures impose limitations on 
coverage as well. 
D. Limitations on Coverage 
1. Restitution and Disgorgement 
Although the typical definition of loss does not explicitly 
exclude payments that are restitutionary in nature, courts in 
many jurisdictions have held such awards uninsurable based on 
two rationales.43 First, several courts have held that 
restitutionary payments, or payments that represent the 
disgorgement of wrongfully or illegally obtained profits, “are 
uninsurable because such amounts do not constitute loss” within 
the meaning of an insurance policy.44 Other courts have held 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Cohen v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. C20092552, 2011 WL 8780709, at 
*3 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011) (quoting the insurance policy as providing that 
loss does not include “matters which are uninsurable under the law pursuant to 
which this policy is construed”); Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Am. Cas. Co., 426 
A.2d 94, 95 (Pa. 1981) (quoting the insurance policy as providing that “loss shall 
not include fines imposed by the law, or matters which shall be deemed 
uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy shall be construed”). 
 42. See, e.g., Zayed v. Arch Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 2d 956, 965 (D. Minn. 
2013) (“Arch argues that Cook’s claim for return of Oxford’s $2.5 million 
investment in Mesa is ‘uninsurable under [Minnesota] law,’ and thus the 
judgment entered against Mesa . . . is not a ‘Loss’ for purposes of the Policy.”). 
 43. See infra Part III.B–C (providing a detailed discussion of cases holding 
that restitutionary payments are uninsurable, either under the interpretive 
principles of contract law or under the public policy rationale); DAVISSON ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 70–75 (discussing numerous cases that have found 
restitutionary payments and disgorgement of ill-gotten profits uninsurable). 
 44. DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 70; see, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that 
Safeway’s payment of an $11.5 million early dividend is not a loss under the 
terms of the D&O policy because “[n]either the owners of that corporation nor 
its directors suffered a loss”); CNL Hotels & Resorts v. Hous. Cas. Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 2d 1317, 1324–26 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“[I]f the insured is simply being forced 
to return money to which it was not entitled, the event is not a loss.”); Vigilant 
Ins. Co. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 782 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004) (“Restitution of ill-gotten funds does not constitute ‘damages’ or a ‘loss’ as 
those terms are used in insurance policies.”). 
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“that it is against public policy to insure against the risk of being 
ordered to return money or property that has been wrongfully 
acquired.”45 In some states, it is also against public policy to 
afford coverage for intentionally harmful or criminal 
misconduct.46 However, some jurisdictions permit coverage for 
intentional acts.47 Insurers can assert a state’s public policy as a 
defense to coverage under circumstances in which the insured is 
seeking coverage for restitutionary awards, disgorgement, or 
intentional acts.48 
2. Intentional Acts 
In the majority of jurisdictions, insurance coverage for 
intentional wrongdoing is precluded in two situations.49 The first 
                                                                                                     
 45. DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 70; see, e.g., Bank of the W. v. Super. 
Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 554 (Cal. 1992) (“At least absent demonstrably unusual 
circumstances, we have doubts whether an insurance policy which purported to 
insure a party against payments of a restitutionary nature would comport with 
public policy.”); Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 426 A.2d at 97 (“Because this 
Commonwealth’s public policy does not permit a school district to make 
unlawful taxation just as revenue-productive as lawful taxation, it must be 
concluded that a political subdivision’s return of tax monies to its taxpayers 
collected by an unlawful tax is uninsurable.”). 
 46. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55 F.3d 1420, 1423 
(9th Cir. 1995) (“It is true, as St. Paul argues, that Alaska recognizes a general 
public policy against insuring a person against liability for his or her intentional 
acts.”); Grumman Sys. Support Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 828 F. Supp. 11, 
13 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (“This Court finds that an insurance agreement that 
indemnifies for liability incurred as a direct result of a violation of an injunction 
is void as against public policy.”); Marie Y. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 135, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (providing that California Insurance Code 
Section 533 codifies California’s public policy, which precludes insurance 
coverage for willful acts and reads the exclusion into every insurance policy); 
Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. 1981) (providing 
that whether insurance coverage for civil liability arising from a criminal act is 
precluded by public policy “depends upon whether the insured, in committing 
his criminal act, intended to cause injury”). 
 47. See infra note 56 (discussing cases that have found that it is not against 
public policy to insure against losses resulting from intentional acts). 
 48. See DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 75 (explaining that in states 
where it is against public policy to cover certain acts, the state’s public policy 
becomes a defense to coverage). 
 49. See id. (discussing the two situations in which courts preclude 
insurance coverage for intentional wrongdoing). 
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situation is “where the insured acted with the subjective intent to 
cause harm to a third party.”50 To determine whether the insured 
acted with the requisite subjective intent, courts consider 
whether the insured intended to inflict the injury.51 If the 
insured’s intentional act caused unintended injury, then public 
policy will not preclude coverage because the insured did not act 
with the requisite intent.52 The second situation is “where the 
harm is an inherent result of the conduct at issue.”53 In such a 
situation, regardless of the insured’s subjective intent, courts will 
infer intent to injure from the nature of the insured’s act.54 For 
example, “courts have inferred intent to harm in claims arising 
from misconduct including securities fraud, assault, and 
malicious prosecution.”55 However, there are some jurisdictions 
that permit coverage for intentional acts.56 Because courts 
                                                                                                     
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. (discussing how courts analyze coverage for intentional acts). 
 52. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. 
1981) (“One who intentionally injures another may not be indemnified for any 
civil liability thus incurred. However, one whose intentional act causes an 
unintended injury may be so indemnified.”).  
 53. DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 75. 
 54. See, e.g., Dodge v. Legion Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 2d 144, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (“When the alleged harm is an inherent result of the act, however, intent 
to injure will be inferred as a matter of law from the intentional character of the 
conduct.”); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcom, 517 A.2d 800, 802 (N.H. 1986) (“Nor can 
an insured’s intentional act be an accidental cause of injury when it is so 
inherently injurious that it cannot be performed without causing the resulting 
injury.”). 
 55. DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 76; see, e.g., Dodge, 102 F. Supp. 2d 
at 150 (finding that the insured’s acts “of kissing, embracing, sodomizing and 
engaging in intercourse with Dodge during her therapy sessions” are 
intrinsically intentional); Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 
506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (providing that the harm and injury caused by 
malicious prosecution to the plaintiff and the judicial process “were both 
inherent and predictable,” so the insurer was not required to indemnify the 
insured for a settlement of the malicious prosecution claims). 
 56. See Mo. Pub. Entity Risk Mgmt. Fund v. Investors Ins. Co., 338 F. 
Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (W.D. Mo. 2004) (concluding that it is not against public 
policy to enforce insurance contracts that cover intentional acts of 
discrimination); Chi. Bd. of Options Exch. Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 
1184, 1187 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that there is no Illinois public policy against 
a corporation insuring against losses stemming from the intentional torts of its 
directors and officers); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 
530, 541 (Iowa 2002) (concluding that freedom of contract for insurance coverage 
should prevail over the public policy reasons for barring coverage for the 
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generally hold that it is against public policy to insure against 
intentional conduct,57 punitive damages for those intentional acts 
are also not within the scope of coverage.58 
3. Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are damages “awarded against a person to 
punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and 
others like him from similar conduct in the future.”59 There is a 
substantial split among courts as to whether punitive damages 
arising out of an accident, or awarded for gross, malicious, 
wanton, or reckless conduct, are covered under the terms of a 
liability policy.60 Courts holding that punitive damages are 
                                                                                                     
intentional act of fraud). 
 57. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text (discussing situations in 
which courts prohibit coverage for intentional wrongdoing). 
 58. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 522 (providing that punitive 
damages for an intentional tort are not coverable because it would be against 
public policy to permit such coverage). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). 
 60. Compare Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dale, 914 So. 2d 698, 703 (Miss. 2005) 
(holding that Mississippi law does not prevent insurers from excluding coverage 
for punitive damages, but insurers may provide additional coverage for punitive 
damages), Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 436 
S.E.2d 243, 246 (N.C. 1993) (holding that a policy that covered compensatory or 
nominal damages for bodily injury also covered liability for punitive damages 
because “[p]unitive damages were recovered because of the recovery for bodily 
injuries”), Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. 
1964) (allowing coverage for punitive damages and stating that if insurers 
believe punitive damages protection should not be afforded, then insurers can 
make a provision in the exclusions section to that effect), Fluke Corp. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 P.3d 809, 816 (Wash. 2001) (stating that the 
policy at issue provided indemnification for “damages” without limiting payment 
to compensatory damages or expressly excluding punitive damages, and 
insurers cannot “raise public policy as a sword to sever the bargain between 
insurer and insured”), and Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 
1981) (refusing to find that West Virginia “public policy precludes insurance 
coverage for punitive damages arising from gross, reckless or wanton 
negligence”), with Bohrer v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 12 P.3d 854, 857 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2000) (concluding that “an insurer’s promise to pay post-judgment interest 
on punitive damages and damages for intentional torts is against public policy”), 
McCabe v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 914 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817–18 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2010) (finding that attorney’s professional liability insurer was not 
obligated to indemnify him with respect to the award of treble damages because 
“New York public policy precludes insurance indemnification for punitive 
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uninsurable focus on the nature and purpose of punitive 
damages, which is the deterrence of certain kinds of conduct.61 
Permitting insureds to escape liability for punitive damages 
would frustrate the deterrent effect of such damages.62 Insurers 
try to avoid insuring people against risks that are more likely to 
occur if they have insurance because this creates the problem of 
“moral hazard.”63 Typically, insurance policies will state that the 
insurer will provide coverage for “all sums which the insured is 
legally obligated to pay as damages.”64 Despite this broad 
language providing coverage for damages, courts have found that 
punitive damages are not included in the term “damages.”65 
On the other hand, some courts have held that when there is 
no provision in the policy specifically excluding punitive damages, 
there can be coverage for punitive damages.66 In terms of 
                                                                                                     
damage awards”), and City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 463 N.W.2d 
845, 848–49 (S.D. 1990) (finding that civil penalties requested by the United 
States in the federal lawsuit were punitive in nature and that the award of 
punitive damages would violate public policy). 
 61. See, e.g., City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 
848–49 (S.D. 1990) (“Two interests implicated by an award of punitive damages 
are punishment to the wrongdoer and deterrence of the wrongdoer’s conduct.”). 
 62. See State Fund Mut. Ins. Co. v. Enebo, 458 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (“Allowing a person against whom punitive damages are assessed to 
shift responsibility for paying those damages to an insurer would frustrate the 
deterrent purpose of punitive damages.”); City of Fort Pierre, 463 N.W.2d at 849 
(“Were a person able to insure himself against economic consequences of his 
intentional wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility 
would be missing.”).  
 63. See Mortenson v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 249 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 
2001) (“The temptation that insurance gives the insured to commit the very act 
insured against is called . . . ‘moral hazard’ and is the reason that fire insurance 
companies refuse to insure property for more than it is worth—they don’t want 
to tempt the owner to burn it down.”). 
 64. 12 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 172:33. 
 65. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 237 S.E.2d 341, 345 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1977) (concluding that “the inclusive language of the policy does not cover 
punitive damages that might be assessed against the insured”). Punitive 
damages do not constitute compensation for injuries sustained. Id. Rather, 
punitive damages are awarded over and above actual damages in an effort to 
punish the defendant and to deter certain types of conduct. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 
1978) (finding that the unqualified wording of the policy, which provided that 
the insurer agreed “[t]o indemnify the insured for all sums which the insured 
shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability . . . imposed on the insured by 
law,” includes both actual and punitive damages); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. 
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interpretation of policy language, these courts view punitive 
damages as covered by the express words of the policy.67 In 
Meijer, Inc. v. General Star Indemnity Co.,68 the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan permitted coverage for 
punitive damages because the policy did not explicitly exclude 
them.69 The court reasoned that 
[t]o hold that punitive damages are not recoverable would 
create, in effect, an exclusion for which the parties did not 
negotiate and allow insurance companies to collect premiums 
for coverage of a risk that they voluntarily assumed and then 
escape their obligation to pay on a claim by a mere judicial 
declaration that the contract is void by reason of public 
policy.70 
Some legislatures have passed laws addressing the 
insurability of punitive damages.71 In Virginia, for example, the 
legislature has declared that it is not against the public policy of 
                                                                                                     
Stebbins Five Cos., No. 302CV1279M, 2004 WL 210636, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
27, 2004) (“Accordingly, the Court finds that the CGL agreement and the 
Professional Liability agreement unambiguously provide coverage for an award 
of punitive damages, unless otherwise excluded.”); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. 
City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863 (Alaska 1984) (“Under the terms of the policy 
Providence has not specifically excluded punitive damages. We therefore 
conclude that the liability policy Providence issued to Valdez provides coverage 
for punitive damages.”); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 
Inc., 743 S.W.2d 693, 702 (Tex. App. 1987) (noting that “Texas courts that have 
interpreted the ‘all sums’ phrase have held that the term encompasses punitive 
damages” and holding that policy providing coverage for “all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . bodily 
injury” covered punitive damages). 
 67. See S.C. State Budget & Control Bd. v. Prince, 403 S.E.2d 643, 648 
(S.C. 1991) (finding that the policy at issue does not limit recovery to actual 
damages because the policy did not define damages). Because the policy used 
broad language, providing that “[t]he Fund will pay on behalf of the insured all 
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages,” the 
policy must be read as encompassing punitive damages. Id.  
 68. 826 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1993). 
 69. See id. at 247 (“Under Michigan law, insurers may limit the risks that 
they elect to assume, but they must clearly express limitations on coverage and 
any failure to do so is construed against the drafting insurer and in favor of 
finding coverage under the policy.”). 
 70. Id. at 247. 
 71. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 525–26 (discussing several 
states where legislatures have spoken on the matter of insurance coverage for 
punitive damages). 
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Virginia “for any person to purchase insurance providing 
coverage for punitive damages arising out of the death or injury 
of any person as the result of negligence, including willful and 
wanton negligence, but excluding intentional acts.”72 The Kansas 
legislature passed a statute providing that it is not against the 
public policy of Kansas for a person or entity to obtain insurance 
coverage for punitive damages vicariously imposed.73 At least in 
the context of automobile insurance, a South Carolina statute 
defines “damages” as including “both actual and punitive 
damages.”74 When the legislature speaks, the legislative 
pronouncement is controlling.75 Therefore, if a legislature passes 
a statute specifically providing that punitive damages are 
uninsurable, then the statute would override an insurance policy 
provision providing coverage for punitive damages.76  
In short, to determine whether an award of punitive damages 
is covered by the insurance policy, the court must first refer to 
the language of the insurance policy.77 If there is an explicit 
exclusion for punitive damages, then such exclusion is typically 
enforceable, and no coverage exists.78 However, if there is no such 
                                                                                                     
 72. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (2013). 
 73. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,115 (2013) (providing that a person or entity 
may obtain insurance coverage for punitive damages vicariously imposed on the 
insured “without the actual prior knowledge of such insured”). 
 74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(4) (2013). South Carolina also requires that 
an automobile insurance policy contain “a provision insuring the persons 
defined as insured against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within 
the United States or Canada.” Id. § 38-77-140. This statute requires auto 
liability insurance for “damages,” which includes actual and punitive damages 
per Section 38-77-30(4). Id. 
 75. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 526 (discussing legislative 
pronouncements on the insurability of punitive damages). 
 76. See 12 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 172:38 (providing that if a statute 
prohibits coverage for punitive damages, then the statute is controlling 
regardless of what the policy provides). 
 77. See, e.g., Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Stebbins Five Cos., No. 302CV1279M, 
2004 WL 210636, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2004) (“First, it must be shown that 
the policy’s terms provide for and do not exclude coverage of a punitive damages 
award.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Massena v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 724 
N.Y.S.2d 107, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (stating that the policies at issue 
“expressly exclude claims arising from interference with contract, punitive 
damages, malicious civil acts or omissions, and defamation”). Because punitive 
damages were explicitly excluded, the insurer had no duty to indemnify the 
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exclusion, then the result depends upon the specific court’s 
conception of punitive damages.79 When faced with coverage 
disputes, courts must employ the principles of contract 
interpretation to determine whether there is coverage for the 
remedy granted in the underlying suit. 
E. Interpretation of Insurance Contracts 
Often, parties to an insurance policy dispute the meaning of 
its terms and conditions.80 In order to resolve such disputes, the 
insurer or insured brings a declaratory judgment action seeking 
an interpretation of the policy or an interpretation of a word or 
phrase used in the policy.81 Although the courts often use the 
terms “construction” and “interpretation” interchangeably, the 
terms technically do not have the same meaning. While the 
“construction of an insurance policy is the process of determining 
the policy’s legal effect[,] interpretation is the process of 
determining the meaning of the words used in the policy.”82 
It is a well-settled rule that general principles of contract 
interpretation apply to insurance policies.83 Therefore, like any 
                                                                                                     
insured. Id. 
 79. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (discussing how some 
courts hold that punitive damages are not covered by the general term 
“damages,” while others hold that punitives are covered by the term “damages” 
and that it is not against public policy to provide coverage for punitives). 
 80. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 125 (discussing kinds and 
causes of imprecision in contracts). 
 81. See 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 21:1 (discussing how disputes 
between an insurer and its insured are resolved when the parties disagree about 
terms or conditions in the policy); Meijer, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 826 F. 
Supp. 241, 243 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (providing that the insured brought a 
declaratory judgment action to determine whether coverage existed for punitive 
damages and attorney fees awarded in a tort suit against the insured). 
 82. Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2008). 
 83. See, e.g., SDR Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 
320 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“Although insurance contracts have 
special features, they are still contracts subject to the ordinary rules of contract 
interpretation.”); Jimenez v. State Farm Lloyds, 968 F. Supp. 330, 332 (W.D. 
Tex. 1997) (“In Texas, insurance contracts are interpreted by the same rules as 
are other contracts.”); Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 
1087 (D.C. 2008) (“Disputes relating to the respective obligations of the parties 
to an insurance contract should generally be addressed within the principles of 
law relating to contracts, and bad faith conduct can be compensated within 
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other contract, an insurance policy is to be construed to give effect 
to the intentions of the parties at the time of contracting.84 To 
ascertain the intent of the parties, courts must look to what the 
policy itself says.85 When courts look to the policy at issue, they 
view the insurance contract “in [its] entirety and do not interpret 
phrases in isolation.”86 When the terms of the insurance policy 
are clear and unambiguous, “the court may not resort to the rules 
of construction, and the terms are to be accorded their plain and 
ordinary meaning as an ordinary or reasonable person would 
understand them.”87 Generally, courts will enforce “an insurance 
policy as written unless the policy language contains an 
ambiguity.”88 
An ambiguity in an insurance policy will be found only if “the 
policy is susceptible to more than one interpretation and 
reasonably intelligent persons would honestly differ as to its 
meaning.”89 To determine whether an insurance policy contains 
                                                                                                     
those principles.”); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Douthat, 449 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1994) 
(“Initially, we observe that insurance policies are contracts whose terms are 
construed in accordance with the general principles applicable to all contracts.”). 
 84. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 681 (stating that the “cardinal principle” in 
the construction of insurance policies “is that the intent of the parties must 
control”). 
 85. See Boutilier v. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co., 681 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Neb. 
2004) (“[A] court shall seek to ascertain the intention of the parties from the 
plain meaning of the policy.”). 
 86. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bauer, 977 P.2d 617, 620 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
 87. Boutilier, 681 N.W.2d at 750; see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & 
Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Absent ambiguity, in South Carolina the 
language of an insurance policy is given its plain, ordinary, and popular 
meaning.”); City of Burlington v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co, 655 A.2d 719, 721 
(Vt. 1994) (providing that any “[d]isputed terms should be read according to 
their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning”). 
 88. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005); 
see also Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2008) 
(“In the construction of insurance policies, the cardinal principle is that the 
intent of the parties must control; and except in cases of ambiguity this is 
determined by what the policy itself says.” (citation omitted)); Boutilier, 681 
N.W.2d at 750 (“But a contract written in clear and unambiguous language is 
not subject to interpretation or construction and must be enforced according to 
its terms.” (citation omitted)); Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 
735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (“Where, however, the language of the contract is 
clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 89. 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 21:11. 
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an ambiguity, courts examine the policy as a whole, rather than 
clause by clause.90 An insurance policy is not ambiguous simply 
because the parties disagree over the policy’s interpretation.91 
The fact that some people have difficulty understanding the 
language in an insurance policy does not render the policy 
ambiguous.92 When a court finds an ambiguity in an insurance 
policy, the policy is construed against the drafter of the 
document, the insurer, and in favor of the insured.93 The rule of 
construction against the insurer comports with the general 
principle of contract law that “doubtful language is to be 
interpreted most strongly against the party who used it in 
drafting the contract.”94 Because courts will not employ the rule 
of construction against the insurer if there are no ambiguities in 
the policy,95 insurers will argue that there is no ambiguity and 
that the court can interpret the disputed portion by the plain 
meaning of the words used in the policy at issue.96 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Cary, 108 P.3d at 290 (discussing how to determine whether an 
insurance policy is ambiguous). 
 91. See Union Ins. Co. v. Houtz, 883 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Colo. 1994) (“A mere 
disagreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the policy does 
not create an ambiguity.”). 
 92. See Nordi v. Keystone Health Plan W., Inc., 989 A.2d 376, 381 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010) (comparing someone’s lack of understanding of an insurance 
policy with the idea that a middle-aged judge finds “precise and unambiguous 
instructions for the latest computer software program . . . befuddling but a 15-
year-old high school student finds [such instructions] simple and easy to 
follow”). 
 93. See Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106 (“Where a provision of a 
policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer.”); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 
1272, 1274 (Utah 1993) (“If a policy is ambiguous, doubt is resolved against the 
insurer.”). 
 94. 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 22:22. 
 95. See Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274 (“[I]f a policy is not ambiguous, no 
presumption in favor of the insured arises and the policy language is construed 
according to its usual and ordinary meaning.”). 
 96. See Blackburn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 784 So. 2d 637, 641 (La. 
2001) (“In analyzing a policy provision, the words, often being terms of art, must 
be given their technical meaning. When those technical words are unambiguous 
and the parties’ intent is clear, the insurance contract will be enforced as 
written.”); Bergeron v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 766 A.2d 256, 259 (N.H. 
2000) (providing that a court will not “perform amazing feats of linguistic 
gymnastics to find a term ambiguous” and to construe it in favor of the insured). 
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In sum, the interpretation of an insurance policy involves a 
three-step analysis by the court: 
(1) the intent of the parties must be inferred, if possible, solely 
from the written provisions of the contract; (2) if the court is 
faced with ambiguous policy language, ambiguity is resolved 
by interpreting the ambiguous provision in the sense in which 
the promisor (insurer) reasonably believed at the time of 
making it, that the promisee (insured) understood it; (3) if the 
ambiguity is not eliminated through an application of this 
rule, then ambiguous language is construed against the party 
who caused the uncertainty to exist [insurer]. It is not 
necessary, in the absence of evidence establishing mutual 
understanding of the parties, to proceed directly to the third 
prong of the interpretive framework and construe policy 
language against the insurer. An insurance policy must be 
construed according to its terms and the evident intent of the 
parties as expressed in the policy language.97 
Courts adopt different versions of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations,98 which is the second step in the analysis above. 
Some courts adopt a version of the doctrine that requires a 
finding of ambiguity before the doctrine can be invoked, while 
others view the doctrine as more than a rule of construction.99 
Those courts that err on the side of the second viewpoint adopt 
Professor (later Judge) Keeton’s view that “the objectively 
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries 
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even 
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have 
negated those expectations.”100 A court’s interpretation of an 
insurance contract in a coverage dispute is crucial because it will 
                                                                                                     
 97. 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 19, § 21:4. 
 98. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 145 (discussing different 
versions of the doctrine of reasonable expectations). 
 99. Compare Liggatt v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 46 P.3d 1120, 1127 (Kan. 
2002) (“Unless there is a finding that an insurance policy is ambiguous, the 
reasonable expectations doctrine does not permit the court to reform the 
unambiguous meaning of the contract.”), with Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. 
Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Pa. 1978) (focusing on the reasonable expectation of 
the insured). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion represents the view 
that “[c]ourts should be concerned with assuring that the insurance purchasing 
public’s reasonable expectations are fulfilled.” Id. 
 100. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions: Part One, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
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determine whether the court will permit coverage for the remedy 
granted in the underlying suit. 
F. Remedies in the Underlying Suit 
In the underlying suit of an insurance coverage action, such 
as a suit for breach of fiduciary duty against a corporate director, 
the plaintiff may be awarded three possible civil remedies for 
which the insured-defendant seeks coverage from its insurer: 
compensatory damages, restitution, and punitive damages.101 A 
court will award compensatory damages “to put the plaintiff, so 
far as money can, where the plaintiff would have been without 
the defendant’s breach or invasion.”102 The plaintiff’s recovery of 
compensatory damages will be measured based on the plaintiff’s 
loss.103 Restitution can be conceptualized as the midpoint, 
situated between compensatory damages on the one hand and 
punitive damages on the other, on a continuum of the three 
remedies.104 A court will measure a plaintiff’s money restitution 
based on the defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff’s loss.105 Punitive 
damages are granted to a plaintiff to punish a defendant for his 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 975 (discussing a court’s choice of 
remedy on behalf of a successful claimant). 
 102. Id.; see Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (“‘Damages’ describes a payment made to compensate a party for injuries 
suffered.”). 
 103. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 975 (discussing a court’s measurement 
of compensatory damages); In re Consol. Objections to Tax Levies of Sch. Dist. 
No. 205, 739 N.E.2d 508, 513 (Ill. 2000) (“Compensatory damages are damages 
sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 104. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 973–74 (“Restitution’s policy 
justifications often overlap with compensatory damages at one end of the 
continuum and with punitive damages at the other.”). 
 105. See id. at 975 (providing that a court will grant money restitution in 
order to prevent or reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment); Ellett Bros., Inc. 
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Restitution and 
disgorgement require payment of the defendant’s ill-gotten gain, not 
compensation of the plaintiff’s loss.”); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: 
DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION 369 (2d ed. 1993) (providing that the goal of 
compensatory damages is to provide compensation for the plaintiff’s loss, while 
the goal of restitution is to force disgorgement of the defendant’s gain). 
COVERAGE FOR ILL-GOTTEN GAINS? 1097 
misconduct and to deter that defendant, as well as similarly 
situated potential defendants, from similar misconduct.106 
If there is unjust enrichment involved in a particular case, 
“[a] court will respond to a defendant’s unjust enrichment by 
granting the plaintiff restitution.”107 “Disgorgement” can be 
conceptualized as a remedy that falls under the general label of 
“restitution,” as “[r]estitution measured by the defendant’s 
wrongful gain is frequently called disgorgement.”108 “The object of 
the disgorgement remedy—to eliminate the possibility of profit 
from conscious wrongdoing—is one of the cornerstones of the law 
of restitution and unjust enrichment.”109 Section 3 of the Third 
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment marks this 
cornerstone and identifies the general principle “underlying the 
‘disgorgement’ remedies in restitution,” whereby a defendant is 
stripped of any wrongful gain.110 Section 3 states: “A person is not 
permitted to profit by his own wrong.”111  
Unlike compensatory damages, “restitution and punitive 
damages rest on discrete noncompensatory policy bases.”112 The 
purpose of both punitive damages and restitution is to deter a 
defendant’s profitable misconduct, but the policy bases for the 
two remedies are not identical.113 While a “court awards a 
plaintiff restitution to deter and to prevent or reverse the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment,” a “court imposes punitive 
damages on a defendant to punish it and to deter it and others 
from misconduct.”114 Because the policies underlying punitive 
damages and restitution “are unclear and may overlap,” it is 
possible “to argue that disgorgement has a punitive quality.”115 
                                                                                                     
 106. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 976 (discussing the functional 
difference between compensatory damages, restitution, and punitive damages). 
 107. Id. at 975; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is subject to liability in restitution.”). 
 108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. a (2011). 
 109. Id. § 51 cmt. e.  
 110. Id. § 3 cmt. a. 
 111. Id. § 3. 
 112. Rendleman, supra note 8, at 975. 
 113. See id. at 980 (comparing restitution with punitive damages). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
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However, “[d]isgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive 
remedy.”116 Various courts have held that a claim for unjust 
enrichment or disgorgement is not the same as punitive damages 
or a penalty.117 
Because the disgorgement remedy deprives a wrongdoer of 
an unlawful gain, disgorgement does not impose a net loss on the 
wrongdoer.118 Therefore, it is possible for a court to conclude that 
the disgorgement of profits will not adequately deter the 
misconduct.119 If a court reaches this conclusion, it may decide to 
award the plaintiff punitive damages as well as restitution.120 
With the background on insurance law in mind, the question 
becomes whether insurance policies cover the remedies of 
restitution and disgorgement. Answering this question can be 
problematic for several reasons. 
III. Controversies Surrounding Coverage for Restitution and 
Disgorgement 
A. The Problem 
Deciding whether there is insurance coverage for restitution 
and disgorgement is especially problematic for several reasons. 
                                                                                                     
 116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. k (2011). 
 117. See In re Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. 1998) 
(“INAPRO’s premise that punitive damages are legally ‘uninsurable’ under 
District law is one we need not evaluate, because we reject the equation of 
disgorgement and punitive damages. The remedy of disgorgement . . . is meant 
to provide just compensation for the wrong, not to impose a penalty.” (citation 
omitted)); Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Minn. 
1984) (holding “that damages measured by the forfeit of attorneys fees for 
breach of a fiduciary duty are not ‘exemplary or punitive damages,’ as that 
phrase is used in the policy, and, therefore, that the exclusion is not 
applicable”). 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 51 cmt. k (2011) (providing that disgorgement is not a punitive remedy 
because the wrongdoer is “left in the position he would have occupied had there 
been no misconduct”). 
 119. See id. (highlighting the difference between restitution and punitive 
damages). 
 120. See id. (discussing a situation in which a court may award both 
restitution and punitive damages). 
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First, restitution is subject to misunderstanding by both lawyers 
and judges.121 One of the major sources of confusion surrounding 
restitution is that the meaning of the word restitution “change[s] 
between the vernacular language and the technical vocabulary of 
remedies.”122 In the ordinary sense of justice, the word restitution 
“may be used to describe any form of recovery or redress.”123 For 
example, if a criminal is ordered to give restitution to his victim, 
that restitution will likely take the form of compensation.124 
Second, insurance companies do not provide a satisfactory 
definition of what constitutes “loss” to an insured. In D&O 
policies, “loss” is typically defined to include damages, judgments, 
and settlements.125 But, insurance policies usually do not provide 
a definition of damages, judgments, or settlements,126 which leads 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 977 (“Restitution specialists frequently 
observe that restitution, which has fallen out of the law school curriculum, is 
subject to professional misunderstanding on every level.”); Andrew Kull, 
Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995) (“To put it 
bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not 
know what restitution is. The subject is no longer taught in law schools, and the 
lawyer who lacks an introduction to its basic principles is unlikely to recognize 
them in practice.”); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 
67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1989) (“Despite its importance, restitution is a 
relatively neglected and underdeveloped part of the law. In the mental map of 
most lawyers, restitution consists largely of blank spaces with undefined 
borders and only scattered patches of familiar ground.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c (2011) (“Employed to denote 
liability based on unjust enrichment, the word ‘restitution’ is a term of art that 
has frequently proved confusing.”). 
 122. Rendleman, supra note 8, at 977. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. (discussing the meaning of the word restitution in the criminal 
law context); George P. Roach, How Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Can 
Improve Your Corporate Claim, 26 REV. LITIG. 265, 274 (2007) (“Criminal 
restitution is a remedy based on compensating damages that seeks to restore 
the plaintiff or victim to her ex ante position by awarding damages.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. e (2011) 
(“It is a natural use of the language to speak of requiring a criminal to ‘make 
restitution’; the problem is that the liability imposed in such cases is not based 
on unjust enrichment but on compensation for harm.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Wedtech Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 214, 216 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting the insurance policy as providing that “the total 
amount which any Insured Person(s) become legally obligated to pay on account 
of all claims made against them for Wrongful Acts with respect to which 
coverage hereunder applies, including, but not limited to, damages, judgments, 
settlements, costs and Defense Costs”). 
 126. See Richard F. Hans, On the Level 3: Reviewing the (Un)insurability of 
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to issues in coverage litigation regarding what is covered under 
the policy. Because “damages” is a general term that 
encompasses “any form of money recovery[,] including recovery 
based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment, [or] restitution,”127 
insureds will often argue that restitution or disgorgement fall 
within damages and should be covered.128 However, such a broad 
reading of the term fails to recognize the distinct meanings of 
compensatory damages, restitution, and punitive damages within 
the technical vocabulary of remedies.129 Finally, insurance 
companies usually do not exclude coverage for restitution and 
disgorgement in the D&O policy exclusions, and if there is such 
an exclusion, the policy does not specifically define restitution 
and disgorgement.130 If such remedies were explicitly excluded, 
then coverage disputes could be resolved more easily. 
1. Interpreting the Controversy Between Insurer Versus Insured 
When faced with coverage disputes, courts have to decide 
whether the insurer is required to pay the claim that the insured 
asserts is covered. As previously discussed, courts have to use the 
interpretive principles of contract law to decide whether there is 
                                                                                                     
Restitutionary Payments, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 165, 167 (2006) 
(discussing language used in insurance policies and which terms are defined 
and which terms are not defined). 
 127. Rendleman, supra note 8, at 977. 
 128. See McMinn, supra note 40, at 1005 (providing that insurers often 
argue that reference to payment “‘as damages’ limits the policy’s application to 
amounts paid to compensate the claimant for covered injury and that amounts 
paid . . . as part of an equitable remedy (the return of ill-gotten gains) are not 
damages”). 
 129. See supra Part II.F (discussing the meanings of compensatory damages, 
restitution, and punitive damages and when each remedy may be awarded by a 
court). 
 130. See William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13-1468, 2014 WL 
185388, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014) (quoting the insurance policy as providing 
that “the term Loss . . . shall not include disgorgement by any Insured or any 
amount reimbursed by any Insured Person” (emphasis added)); Am. Zurich Ins. 
Co. v. Doherty, No 1:05CV866, 2006 WL 1391425, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 19, 2006) 
(quoting the insurance policy as providing that “damages” means “a monetary 
judgment or settlement and does not include fines or statutory penalties 
whether imposed by law or otherwise, nor the return or restitution of legal fees, 
costs and expenses arising therefrom” (emphasis added)). 
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coverage in the particular case at issue.131 Therefore, the court 
must first look to what the policy itself says,132 which includes 
looking at the definition of “loss” and any relevant policy 
exclusions.133 If the policy at issue does not explicitly exclude 
restitution or disgorgement, then the court must decide whether 
restitution or disgorgement fall within the policy definition of 
“loss” or “damages,” whichever is the operative language in the 
policy.134 This may prove difficult for two reasons. First, the 
definition of loss is ambiguous because it includes damages, 
judgments, and settlements but then fails to define those 
terms.135 Second, application of the disgorgement remedy can be 
difficult when problems of attribution are involved because the 
court will have to decide what portion of the defendant’s assets is 
attributable to the underlying wrong.136 Arguably, coverage 
should be granted for the amount the defendant paid to the 
plaintiff in the underlying litigation or in a settlement that is not 
attributable to the defendant’s ill-gotten gain.137 
                                                                                                     
 131. See supra note 83 (providing that general principles of contract 
interpretation apply to insurance policies). 
 132. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (providing that courts 
must first ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the terms of the 
insurance policy). 
 133. See Fid. Bank v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., No. 1:12-CV-4259-RWS, 
2013 WL 4039414, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2013) (discussing the policy 
language, definitions contained in the policy, and relevant policy exclusions). 
 134. See Hans, supra note 126, at 167 (providing that courts must use the 
interpretive principles of contract law to decide whether “these terms, afforded 
their plain and ordinary meaning, include and thus provide coverage for 
disgorgement or other forms of restitutionary payments”). 
 135. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the issues surrounding the definition 
of “loss” in insurance policies). 
 136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 51 cmt. e (2011) (discussing the potential difficulties involved in the 
application of the disgorgement remedy). Application of the disgorgement 
remedy and calculation of profits “is simplest when the whole of the wrongdoer’s 
unjust enrichment is captured in the ownership, possession, or disposition of 
specific property.” Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Ryerson Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 610, 613–14 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“A judgment or settlement in a fraud case could involve a combination of 
restitution and damages, and then the insurance company would be liable for 
the damages portion in accordance with the allocation formula in the policy.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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2. The Definition of “Loss” 
Because D&O policies provide coverage only for “loss” 
resulting from a covered claim based on a wrongful act, a policy’s 
definition of “loss” is critical to determining the scope of 
coverage.138 One central issue is what constitutes loss for the 
purposes of indemnification and entity coverage.139 Loss is a 
defined term in an insurance policy, and it is often defined in a 
restrictive manner.140 The definition of loss generally includes 
damages, judgments, settlements, and the costs of defense.141 
However, the words “damages,” “judgments,” and “settlements” 
are usually not defined in the policy.142 The failure to define these 
terms is especially problematic in the context of coverage for 
restitution and disgorgement because whether there is coverage 
will often turn on whether restitution and disgorgement fall 
within the policy definition of loss.143 Therefore, the court’s 
interpretation of loss, and the terms used in the policy definition 
                                                                                                     
 138. See DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 63 (“For example, if punitive and 
exemplary damages are excluded from the definition of ‘loss,’ an insurer would 
not be obligated to reimburse a punitive damages award.”). 
 139. See id. at 35–36 (discussing several cases that address the issue of 
whether the coverage sought was a covered “loss” under the D&O policy). 
 140. See DAVISSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 70 (providing that loss may be 
defined to exclude “punitive damages, fines, penalties, sanctions, the multiplied 
portion of any multiplied damage award, and matters deemed uninsurable 
under applicable law”); Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 
2010) (quoting the insurance policy as providing that “loss does not include 
matters uninsurable under the law pursuant to which [the policy] is construed”). 
 141. See, e.g., Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 96C5346, 2000 WL 
1053971, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 31, 2000) (quoting the insurance policy as 
providing that “loss” is “the total amount which any insured person becomes 
legally obligated to pay . . . including but not limited to damages, judgments, 
settlements, costs and defense costs”); Bd. of Educ. v. CNA Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 14, 
16 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting the insurance policy as providing that loss includes 
“judgments, settlements and costs, cost of investigation and defense of legal 
actions”). 
 142. See Hans, supra note 126, at 167 (providing terms that are typically not 
defined in the insurance policy). 
 143. See Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1106, 
1115 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The label of ‘restitution’ or ‘damages’ does not dictate 
whether a loss is insurable. The fundamental distinction is not whether the 
insured received ‘some benefit’ from a wrongful act, but whether the claim seeks 
to recover only the money or property that the insured wrongfully acquired.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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of loss, is determinative in the context of coverage for restitution 
and disgorgement. To determine whether to permit coverage for 
restitution and disgorgement, courts engage one of two 
rationales. 
B. Case Law Addressing the Insurability of Restitution and 
Disgorgement 
Courts vary in the ways they interpret a policy’s terms to 
determine whether an insurer has to cover restitutionary 
payments made by an insured. Some courts rely on the 
interpretive principles of contract law144 to decide whether 
restitution and disgorgement are included in the term “loss” 
under the policy.145 However, other courts rely on the public 
policy rationale to deny coverage for disgorgement and 
restitution.146 Courts that employ the interpretive principle must 
ask whether the word “loss” and the terms included in the policy 
definition of loss, “afforded their plain and ordinary meaning, 
include and thus provide coverage for disgorgement or other 
forms of restitutionary payments.”147 Level 3 Communications, 
Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.,148 and the cases that have followed 
its rationale, state that restitution and disgorgement are not 
included within the meaning of “loss” or “damages” as those 
terms are defined in insurance policies.149 While some courts rely 
                                                                                                     
 144. See supra note 83 (discussing the application of general principles of 
contract interpretation to insurance policies). 
 145. See, e.g., Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 910 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“The interpretive principle for which Federal contends—that a ‘loss’ 
within the meaning of an insurance contract does not include the restoration of 
an ill-gotten gain—is clearly right.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 555 (Cal. 1992) 
(“When the law requires a wrongdoer to disgorge money or property acquired 
through a violation of the law, to permit the wrongdoer to transfer the cost of 
disgorgement to an insurer would eliminate the incentive for obeying the law.”). 
If an insured wrongdoer could obtain insurance coverage for restitutionary 
payments or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, then the insured “would retain the 
proceeds of his illegal acts, merely shifting his loss to an insurer.” Id. 
 147. Hans, supra note 126, at 167. 
 148. 272 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 149. See id. at 911 (“An insured incurs no loss within the meaning of the 
insurance contract by being compelled to return property that it had stolen, 
even if a more polite word than ‘stolen’ is used to characterize the claim for the 
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on Level 3 to hold that restitutionary payments or disgorgement 
of ill-gotten gains are not “losses,” other courts rely on public 
policy to conclude that restitution and disgorgement are 
uninsurable under the law that applies to the policy at issue.150 
Still other courts discuss or rely on both the interpretive principle 
and public policy.151 
1. Pre-Level 3 
Level 3 was not the first case to address the insurability of 
restitution nor was it the first case to articulate the interpretive 
principle—“that a ‘loss’ within the meaning of an insurance 
contract does not include the restoration of an ill-gotten gain.”152 
Before Level 3, various courts held that restitutionary payments 
and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains are not covered under 
insurance policies. For example, in Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Harbor Insurance Co.,153 Nortex, the insured, sued Harbor, the 
                                                                                                     
property’s return.”); Town of Brookhaven v. CNA Ins. Cos., No. CV-86-3569, 
1988 WL 23555, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1988) (“The plain and ordinary 
meaning of loss, injury or damage cannot be ignored, and the town simply 
cannot lose that to which it was not legally entitled.” (citation omitted)). 
 150. See, e.g., Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 
1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) (“California case law precludes indemnification and 
reimbursement of claims that seek the restitution of an ill-gotten gain. This 
public policy exclusion for restitutionary relief applies in limited circumstances.” 
(citing Bank of the W., 833 P.2d at 553)); Exec. Risk Indem., Inc. v. Pac. Educ. 
Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162 (D. Haw. 2006) (“Because Hawaii courts 
seek to return illegally obtained property to victims, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
would likely rule that claims for the return of ill-gotten gains should not be 
insurable. Restitution is uninsurable under Hawaii law and therefore not 
covered by the Policy.”).  
 151. See, e.g., Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Am. Cas. Co., 426 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa. 
1981) (“[T]his Commonwealth’s public policy does not permit a school district to 
make unlawful taxation just as revenue-productive as lawful taxation . . . . 
Hence there has been no ‘loss’ within the meaning of the insurance policy . . . .”). 
While the majority opinion in Central Dauphin focused more on public policy 
considerations to preclude coverage, the concurring opinion relied on the 
principles of contract interpretation to preclude coverage. Id. at 98 (Larsen, J., 
concurring). The concurring opinion emphasized that a refund of unlawfully 
collected taxes cannot constitute a loss because “the school district simply 
cannot lose that to which it was not legally entitled.” Id. 
 152. Level 3, 272 F.3d at 910. 
 153. 456 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
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insurer, seeking indemnification for property damage claims 
Nortex paid to Humble Oil & Refining Co. and Texaco, Inc. in the 
underlying suit against Nortex for trespass and conversion.154 In 
the coverage suit, the court stated that the claims were not “for 
property damage within the meaning of the policy,” and employed 
the principles of contract interpretation to conclude that Nortex 
was not entitled to recover under the policy.155 
When Nortex settled the claims of Humble and Texaco it did 
not sustain a ‘loss’ within the meaning of the insurance 
contract; it was merely paying for oil it had removed and sold 
from the land of Humble and Texaco. An insured (under such a 
policy as we have here) does not sustain a covered loss by 
restoring to its rightful owners that which the insured, having 
no right thereto, has inadvertently acquired. (The insured’s 
innocence and good faith are immaterial.) The insurer did not 
contract to indemnify the insured for disgorging that to which 
it was not entitled in the first place, or for being deprived of 
profits to which it was not entitled.156 
Similarly, in Town of Brookhaven v. CNA Insurance Cos.,157 
the town sought coverage from its insurer, CNA, for payments 
made by the town as a result of three “tax distribution actions” 
filed by school districts against the town.158 The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York used the interpretive 
principle to deny coverage159 and rejected CNA’s public policy 
argument.160 The court reasoned that the payments to the school 
districts amount to “interest on the sums that the Town 
underpaid the School Districts collectively for the time such 
underpayment continued.”161 The court viewed the interest 
earned by the town on the unlawfully held funds as “the benefit 
enjoyed by the town by virtue of its improper withholding of 
                                                                                                     
 154. See id. at 490 (discussing the underlying suit against Nortex). 
 155. Id. at 493. 
 156. Id. at 493–94.  
 157. No. CV-86-3569, 1988 WL 23555 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1988). 
 158. See id. at *1 (discussing the underlying “tax distribution actions” filed 
against the Town of Brookhaven). 
 159. See id. (“I find that the Town of Brookhaven will suffer no recoverable 
loss . . . .”). 
 160. See id. at *6 (“Public Policy does not dictate a denial of recovery in the 
present case.”). 
 161. Id. at *3. 
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money which should have been earning interest on behalf of the 
districts.”162 Therefore, the town was never entitled to the use of 
those funds, and “disgorgement of them does not cause ‘injury or 
damage’ to the town within the meaning of the policy.”163 
A few years later, in Bank of the West v. Superior Court,164 
the insured argued that “the term ‘damages’ for insurance 
purposes includes virtually all forms of monetary relief.”165 The 
California Supreme Court rejected the insured’s argument, 
stating that “[i]t is well established that one may not insure 
against the risk of being ordered to return money or property that 
has been wrongfully acquired. Such orders do not award 
‘damages’ as that term is used in insurance policies.”166 
Although courts had addressed the insurability of restitution 
or disgorgement previously, Level 3 marked an important 
milestone because it “was the first [case] to articulate broadly 
those interpretive principles which bar coverage [for 
restitutionary payments].”167 Level 3 brought attention to the 
issues surrounding insurance coverage for restitution, and many 
courts and litigants began to cite, and continue to cite, its 
interpretive principle.168 
2. Level 3 and the Interpretive Principle 
In Level 3, the insured, Level 3 Communications, Inc., made 
a claim under its D&O policy after settling a securities fraud suit 
brought against it by former shareholders of an acquired 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992). 
 165. Id. at 553. 
 166. See id. (citing multiple cases from various jurisdictions that support 
this proposition). 
 167. Hans, supra note 126, at 167. 
 168. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Franklin Park, 523 
F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing Level 3); Bank v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 
No. 1:12-CV-4259-RWS, 2013 WL 4039414, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2013) (same); 
Exec. Risk Indem., Inc. v. Pac. Educ. Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Haw. 
2006) (same); J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076 (N.Y. 
2013) (same); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos. Inc., 814 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. 
Super. Ct. 2006) (same); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 782 
N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (same). 
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corporation who claimed that Level 3 defrauded them.169 The 
plaintiffs in the underlying securities fraud suit alleged that they 
sold shares in their corporation to Level 3 because of Level 3’s 
fraudulent representations.170 The plaintiffs sought to recover the 
monetary value of the shares.171 The securities fraud suit settled 
for $11.8 million, and the district court concluded that the 
settlement was a loss within the meaning of the policy.172 
Therefore, the district court held that Federal, the insurance 
company, was liable to its insured, Level 3.173 Federal appealed to 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Although the definition of “loss” in the policy at issue 
included “settlements,” Federal argued that the relief sought in 
the underlying suit was restitutionary in nature and was not 
covered by the policy.174 In addition, Federal argued that “a D&O 
policy is designed to cover only losses that injure the insured, not 
ones that result from returning stolen property.”175 Stating that 
“the interpretive principle controls this case,” the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the relief the plaintiffs sought was “restitutionary 
in character.”176 The amount the plaintiffs obtained in the 
settlement of their claim was restitutionary in nature because 
“that amount was part of Level 3’s gain from its officers’ 
misbehavior,” and thus was not covered under Level 3’s D&O 
policy.177 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 909–10 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing the underlying securities fraud suit). 
 170. See id. at 910 (“In effect, Level 3 was accused of having obtained the 
plaintiffs’ company by false pretenses . . . .”). 
 171. See id. (“[T]he plaintiffs’ suit sought to rescind the transaction and 
recover their shares, or rather the monetary value of the shares because their 
company can no longer be reconstituted.”). 
 172. See id. at 909 (discussing the district court’s determinations on 
remand). 
 173. See id. (providing that Federal was liable to Level 3 for $10 million due 
to the “insured versus insured” exclusion in the policy, which applied to one of 
the plaintiffs, Pompliano, who “had been a director of one of Level 3’s 
subsidiaries, and as a result was covered by Federal’s policy”). 
 174. See id. 909–10 (providing that Federal argues it is as if Level 3 had 
stolen cash from the former shareholders and had been forced to return it and is 
“now asking the insurance company to pick up the tab”). 
 175. Id. at 910. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 911. The shareholders sought to divest Level 3 “of the present 
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Even though the outcome in Level 3 turned on the absence of 
compensation to the claimant in the underlying suit, the Seventh 
Circuit suggested that “loss or damages exist where the insured’s 
payment is intended to compensate the claimant for injury or 
harm rather than merely stripping the defendant of allegedly ill-
gotten gain.”178 In dicta, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the 
insurer would be required to provide coverage if the insured made 
a payment to the underlying claimant in the absence of any 
measurable benefit to the insured.179 Other courts have also 
distinguished between returning ill-gotten gains and 
compensating the plaintiff and have held that restitution and 
disgorgement do not fall within the meaning of “loss” or 
“damages” as those terms are used in insurance policies.180 The 
                                                                                                     
value of the property obtained by fraud, minus the cost to the defendant of 
obtaining the property.” Id. at 910–11. 
 178. McMinn, supra note 40, at 1005 n.21. 
 179. See Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 
2001) (providing situations in which there would be a covered loss). One 
example of a situation in which there would be a covered loss is if a corporate 
officer made a fraudulent statement “that inflated the price of the corporation’s 
stock without conferring any measurable benefit on the corporation.” Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Ellett Bros. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (“Restitution and disgorgement require payment of the defendant’s 
ill-gotten gain, not compensation of the plaintiff’s loss.”); Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. 
Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (“The defendant is asked to 
return something he wrongfully received; he is not asked to compensate the 
plaintiff for injury suffered as a result of his conduct.”). The Jaffe court 
concluded that “payments of a restitutionary nature . . . are not ‘damages’ 
within the meaning of Jaffe’s policy.” Id. at 571. But see AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. 
Ct., 799 P.2d 1253, 1274 (Cal. 1990) (“Whatever technical distinctions we and 
other courts have drawn between restitution and compensatory damages in 
other contexts, in ordinary terms both concepts are within the definition of 
‘damages.’”); Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 1033 
(Md. 1993) (“The ordinary person understands ‘damages’ as meaning money 
paid to make good an insured loss. In this context, environmental response costs 
fall within that definition.”). However, AIU and Bausch & Lomb can be 
distinguished because both cases involve coverage issues under comprehensive 
general liability (CGL) policies in the context of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). Within this context, “there is a split of authority 
over whether environmental cleanup costs [incurred pursuant to CERCLA] 
constitute ‘damages’ under an insurance policy.” Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 455, 459 (S.C. 2004). The South Carolina 
Supreme Court stated that “[t]he majority of state courts have held that there is 
coverage for these costs.” Id. (citations omitted).  
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view of those courts that distinguish between returning ill-gotten 
gains and compensating the plaintiff is in accordance with the 
Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.181 
Regardless of what label a court uses, it is important to 
distinguish between a remedy that requires a defendant to 
disgorge its ill-gotten gain in order to prevent unjust enrichment 
and a remedy that requires a defendant to compensate a plaintiff 
for harm or damage suffered. This distinction is critical in the 
context of coverage for restitution or disgorgement because a 
court’s characterization of the remedy will often determine 
whether the disputed claim is covered or not covered by the 
insurance company. 
3. Post-Level 3 and Reactions to Level 3 
After Level 3, courts began to follow Level 3’s rationale to 
conclude that restitution or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains does 
not fall within the meaning of loss under D&O and liability 
insurance policies. In Conseco, Inc. v. National Union Fire 
Insurance Co.,182 the court stated, “[i]t is axiomatic that insurance 
cannot be used to pay an insured for amounts an insured 
wrongfully acquires and is forced to return, or to pay the 
corporate obligations of an insured.”183 After this statement, the 
court cited Level 3, among others, and then concluded: “Indiana 
law is consistent with these cases. Insurance cannot be used to 
unjustly enrich insureds. Further, an insured is not allowed to 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (“Although the concept of ‘restitution’ may have a broader meaning in 
other contexts, we limit our reference to it here to situations in which the 
defendant is required to restore to the plaintiff that which was wrongfully 
acquired.”); Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 556 (Cal. 1992) (“To 
emphasize the distinction between what is insurable and what is not, we noted 
that Jaffe bars coverage only in ‘situations in which the defendant is required to 
restore to the plaintiff that which was wrongfully acquired.’” (quoting Jaffe, 214 
Cal. Rptr. at 570–71)); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. a (2011) (“The principal focus of § 51 is on cases in which 
unjust enrichment is measured by the defendant’s profits, where the object of 
restitution is to strip the defendant of a wrongful gain.”). 
 182. No. 49D130202CP000348, 2002 WL 31961447 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 
2002). 
 183. Id. at *6. 
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profit from its wrongdoing through insurance.”184 In Vigilant 
Insurance Co. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp.,185 the New 
York appellate court relied on Level 3 to uphold the lower court’s 
decision that the insured could not recover from its insurer the 
SEC settlement amount that represented the disgorgement of 
improperly acquired funds.186 The court articulated Level 3’s 
interpretive principle: “The risk of being directed to return 
improperly acquired funds is not insurable. Restitution of ill-
gotten funds does not constitute ‘damages’ or a ‘loss’ as those 
terms are used in insurance policies.”187 The court also reasoned 
that restitution of ill-gotten funds fell within the exclusionary 
provision in the definition of loss, which provided that loss does 
not include “matters which are uninsurable under the law.”188 
Eleven years after Level 3, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided Ryerson Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.189 Ryerson 
articulated the same principles as Level 3, concluding that 
Ryerson’s disgorgement of the profits obtained by fraud “was not 
a ‘loss’ to Ryerson within the meaning of the insurance policy.”190 
The Seventh Circuit rightly distinguished between a claim for 
restitution and a claim for damages.191 Both the Seventh Circuit 
in Ryerson and the Ninth Circuit in Unified Western Grocers, Inc. 
                                                                                                     
 184. Id. at *6–7 (citations omitted). 
 185. 782 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 186. See id. at 20 (affirming the lower court’s holding). 
 187. Id. (citing Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908 (7th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 188. See id. (concluding that “restitution of ill-gotten funds is not insurable 
under the law”). 
 189. 676 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 190. Id. at 613. The Seventh Circuit stated that “[y]ou can’t, at least for 
insurance purposes, sustain a ‘loss’ of something you don’t (or shouldn’t) have.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 191. See id. (“[A] claim for restitution is a claim that the defendant has 
something that belongs of right not to him but to the plaintiff.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c 
(2011))). The Seventh Circuit distinguished damages from restitution stating, 
“[a] claim for ‘damages’ in the proper sense of the word is different.” Id. The 
court then provided an example to illustrate the difference between restitution 
and damages: “If a car driven negligently hits and injures a pedestrian, the 
pedestrian will sue the driver for the monetary equivalent of the harm done to 
him, not for the ‘profit’ that the accident generated for the driver. It generated 
no profit; it gave him nothing.” Id. 
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v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co.192 cited one of the core principles 
of Level 3: “[h]ow the claim or judgment order or settlement order 
is worded is irrelevant.”193 This principle is critical for 
determining coverage when the insurance claim at issue could 
potentially be characterized as restitution or disgorgement. The 
courts deciding coverage disputes cannot simply rely upon the 
label that the lower court used or the characterization of a 
settlement by a regulatory agency, such as the SEC.194 Courts 
must look at the nature of the asserted claim or payment.195 For 
example, in Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos.,196 the 
New York appellate court examined the SEC settlement 
agreement’s description of the substance of the loss and 
concluded, “we find an issue of fact as to whether the portion of 
the settlement attributed to disgorgement actually represented 
ill-gotten gains or improperly acquired funds.”197 While some 
courts use the interpretive principles of contract law to conclude 
that restitution and disgorgement do not constitute “loss,” others 
rely on public policy to conclude that restitution and 
disgorgement are uninsurable under the law. 
                                                                                                     
 192. 371 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Haw. 2005). 
 193. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 
2001); see also Ryerson Inc., 676 F.3d at 613 (“But the label isn’t important.” 
(citing Level 3, 272 F.3d at 910–11)); Unified W. Grocers, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d at 
1246 (“In fact, Judge Posner instructs that, regardless of how a claim is worded, 
if the relief sought is restitutionary in character, it is not insurable as a matter 
of law.” (referring to Level 3)). 
 194. See Pan Pac. Retail Props., Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 471 F.3d 961, 966 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“In deciding whether a certain remedy is insurable, we must look 
beyond the labels of the asserted claims or remedies.” (citation omitted)); 
Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“The label of ‘restitution’ or ‘damages’ does not dictate whether a loss is 
insurable.” (citations omitted)). 
 195. See Pan Pac. Retail Props., Inc., 471 F.3d at 966–67 (“An insurer is not 
required to provide coverage for claims seeking the return of something 
wrongfully received, but must still indemnify for claims that seek compensation 
for injury suffered as a result of the insured’s conduct.”). 
 196. 824 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 197. Id. at 94. 
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C. Public Policy 
An alternative argument for an insurer who disputes the 
restitutionary nature of a claim is that the relevant state’s public 
policy bars coverage.198 Some courts find the public policy 
rationale more compelling and have held that restitutionary 
payments in the form of disgorgement are uninsurable because 
coverage for the return of ill-gotten gains would violate 
fundamental principles of public policy. Bank of the West v. 
Superior Court explicitly articulated the public policy rationale: 
When the law requires a wrongdoer to disgorge money or 
property acquired through a violation of the law, to permit the 
wrongdoer to transfer the cost of disgorgement to an insurer 
would eliminate the incentive for obeying the law. Otherwise, 
the wrongdoer would retain the proceeds of his illegal acts, 
merely shifting his loss to an insurer.199 
One of the main principles underlying the public policy rationale 
is “moral hazard.”200 The moral hazard that would result if one 
could insure against disgorgement of ill-gotten gains was 
recognized in Bank of the West: allowing the insured wrongdoer to 
transfer the cost of disgorgement to the insurer “would eliminate 
the incentive for obeying the law.”201 In Unified Western Grocers, 
Inc. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Hawaii stated that Bank of the West represents the 
“majority view” on the issue of whether restitution of an ill-gotten 
gain is uninsurable.202 
                                                                                                     
 198. See, e.g., Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., Inc., No. 602160, 2006 
WL 118368, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2006) (“They contend that the 
disgorgement payment here is uninsurable as a matter of law based on public 
policy because, to allow Bear Stearns to recover its money through insurance, 
would enable it to retain money that it had improperly obtained and would 
eliminate its incentive to obey the law.”). Alternatively, the insureds argued 
“that the return of such ‘ill-gotten funds’ does not constitute damages within the 
meaning of the policies.” Id. 
 199. Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 555 (Cal. 1992). 
 200. See Zayed v. Arch Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 2d 956, 966 (D. Minn. 2013) 
(“[I]n distinguishing insurable claims from uninsurable claims, Minnesota 
courts have been concerned about moral hazard—that is, the risk that, if a 
particular type of wrongful conduct can be insured, people will engage in more of 
that type of wrongful conduct.”). 
 201. Bank of the W., 833 P.2d at 555. 
 202. See Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 371 F. Supp. 2d 
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Courts in which the issue of coverage for restitution is one of 
first impression may either adopt the public policy rationale or 
hold that the relevant state’s public policy does not proscribe 
coverage for restitution. In Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. v. 
Pacific Educational Services, Inc.,203 Hawaii law governed the 
construction of the insurance policy, but the court stated, “neither 
the Hawaii appellate courts nor the Hawaii legislature has 
expressly stated whether restitution is insurable.”204 To resolve 
this issue, the court concluded, “[c]ase law from Hawaii and other 
jurisdictions indicates that the Hawaii Supreme Court would 
likely hold that restitution is uninsurable.”205 
However, in Virginia Mason Medical Center v. Executive Risk 
Indemnity Inc.,206 the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Washington refused to adopt the public policy rationale in 
determining “whether an insurer can provide coverage for the 
risk of being forced to [return] money that was wrongfully 
obtained.”207 Recognizing that “[t]he Washington Supreme Court 
has distinctly acknowledged an absence of public policy in the 
construction of insurance contracts,” the district court found that 
the coverage defined in the policy at issue was insurable under 
Washington law.208 The Washington Supreme Court previously 
indicated that “public policy must be clearly expressed in a state 
statute or judicial decision before it can override an insurance 
policy’s explicit coverage.”209 Additionally, the Washington 
                                                                                                     
1234, 1243–44 (D. Haw. 2005) (citing multiple cases from various jurisdictions 
that reflect the “majority view”). 
 203. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Haw. 2006). 
 204. Id. at 1157. 
 205. Id. The court reasoned that “[a] conclusion that restitution is insurable 
would contravene the express purpose of restitution recognized by Hawaii 
courts, which is to deter wrongdoers from benefitting or otherwise profiting from 
their improper actions.” Id. at 1162. 
 206. No. C07-0636MJP, 2007 WL 3473683 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2007). 
 207. Id. at *4. 
 208. See id. (“Washington courts rarely invoke public policy to override 
express terms of an insurance policy.”). 
 209. Id. (citing Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 P.3d 809 
(Wash. 2001)). In Fluke, the Washington Supreme Court stated, “[i]n sum, 
Hartford can identify no public policy clearly expressed in Washington statutes 
or case law that would justify overriding the policy’s explicit coverage for 
malicious prosecution.” Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 P.3d 
809, 813 (Wash. 2001). 
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Supreme Court had stated, “[t]he paramount public policy . . . is 
the commitment to upholding the plain language of contracts.”210 
Because the insurer, Executive Risk, failed to provide any 
Washington statutes or case law expressing public policy against 
coverage for damages resulting from alleged wrongful acts, the 
court found that the coverage defined in the policy was insurable 
under Washington law.211 As Pacific Educational Services and 
Virginia Mason Medical Center make clear, whether the public 
policy rationale will apply in a given case depends on how the 
particular jurisdiction conceptualizes public policy in the 
insurance context. In several recent cases, the ability of insurance 
companies to rely on the public policy defense to coverage has 
been weakened. 
D. Recent Problematic Cases 
Two 2013 cases, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. v. Vigilant 
Insurance Co. and Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc.,212 have made 
this area of the law regarding insurance coverage for restitution 
and disgorgement even more unsettled than it had been in the 
last few decades. J.P. Morgan Securities highlights the 
uncertainty surrounding the meaning of disgorgement and how it 
should be measured.213 Cohen highlights how the public policy 
rationale can be subject to harsh criticism and provides a 
persuasive analysis for rejecting this rationale.214 Arguably, both 
cases narrow the ability of insurers to rely on the public policy 
rationale to deny coverage for claims or payments labeled as 
                                                                                                     
 210. Fluke, 34 P.3d at 814. 
 211. See Va. Mason Med. Ctr., 2007 WL 3473683, at *4 (providing why the 
settlement at issue was insurable under Washington law).  
 212. 308 P.3d 1196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 
 213. See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 
(N.Y. 2013) (“Bear Stearns alleges that much of the payment, although labeled 
disgorgement by the SEC, did not actually represent the disgorgement of its 
own profits. It submits that the rule precluding coverage for disgorgement 
should apply only where the insured requests coverage for the disgorgement of 
its own illicit gains.”). 
 214. See infra notes 261–262 and accompanying text (providing that 
Arizona’s “exacting” public policy analysis could not be harmonized with the 
“categorical preclusion” of coverage for restitutionary losses).  
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restitution or disgorgement.215 These decisions represent a 
potential victory for insureds if other courts follow suit in limiting 
the ability of insurance companies to rely on the public policy 
rationale.216 A third case from 2013, Fidelity Bank v. Chartis 
Specialty Insurance Co.,217 demonstrates the uncertainty 
surrounding insurance coverage for restitution or disgorgement 
in jurisdictions that have not yet addressed the issue.218 Finally, a 
2014 case, William Beaumont Hospital v. Federal Insurance 
Co.,219 demonstrates how amorphous the term “disgorgement” can 
be.220 Although the context in each of the above cases is different, 
each case highlights the need for a clear definition and 
understanding of restitution and disgorgement, especially in the 
                                                                                                     
 215. See Brian S. Scarbrough & Jan A. Larson, New York Court of Appeals 
Sharply Limits Ability of Insurers to Escape Coverage for “Disgorgement” or 
Restitution, LEXOLOGY (June 19, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library (“[J.P. 
Morgan Securities Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co.] serves as an important victory 
to policyholders by narrowing the ability of insurers to rely on such public policy 
rationales, particularly in the context of SEC settlements.”); J.P. Morgan Sec. 
Inc., 992 N.E.2d at 1083 (comparing the cases the insurers rely on with the 
present action and stating that “in contrast, Bear Stearns alleges that it is not 
pursuing recoupment for the turnover of its own improperly acquired profits 
and, therefore, it would not be unjustly enriched by securing indemnity”); 
Cohen, 308 P.3d at 1200 (“Therefore, before concluding that an insurance policy 
that would have covered the Wood settlement payments would be unenforceable 
as a matter of law, we must consider whether the public policy against insuring 
restitutionary payments would outweigh the interest in enforcing such a 
contract.”). 
 216. See John N. Ellison, New York’s Highest Court ‘Disgorges’ Insurance 
Companies of Overused Non-Policy Based Defense, LEXOLOGY (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library (“[A]s of today, policyholders . . . in New York, 
or those having claims made against them based on activities occurring in New 
York, have a far better chance of obtaining coverage based on what the policy 
covers, instead of facing an [insurer’s] efforts to avoid coverage based on a 
‘public policy’ argument.”). 
 217. No. 1:12-CV-4259-RWS, 2013 WL 4039414 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2013). 
 218. See id. at *3–4 (discussing the “rule” from Bank of the West and Level 3 
but subsequently stating that “this Court hesitates to purport to announce a 
‘new’ Georgia rule”). 
 219. No. 13-1468, 2014 WL 185388 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014). 
 220. See id. at *3 (“Federal’s principal argument is that the nurses’ claims 
arose from Beaumont’s gaining of profit, remuneration, or advantage to which it 
was not entitled and the settlement was a disgorgement of that advantage.”). In 
response to the insurer’s argument, the insured based its counterargument upon 
a verbal distinction between the words “retained” and “acquired.” Id. at *4. The 
insured contends that “money unlawfully retained is not the same in its legal 
character as money wrongfully acquired.” Id. 
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context of insurance coverage. How a court conceptualizes 
restitution and disgorgement will often determine whether a 
claim or payment is covered. 
1. J.P Morgan Securities Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co. 
J.P. Morgan Securities examined whether coverage is 
prohibited “where, as Bear Stearns claims, the disgorgement 
payment was (at least in part) linked to gains that went to 
others.”221 In 2003, the SEC undertook an investigation of Bear 
Stearns & Co., Inc., a broker-dealer, and Bear Stearns Securities 
Corp., a clearing firm (the Bear Stearns companies are now J.P. 
Morgan Securities, Inc.), for allegedly facilitating late trading and 
deceptive market timing on behalf of its hedge fund customers.222 
The SEC notified Bear Stearns of its intent to charge Bear 
Stearns with violations of federal securities laws.223 Bear Stearns 
disputed the proposed charges claiming, 
as a clearing broker that processed transactions initiated by 
others, it did not knowingly violate any law; its management 
did not facilitate the late trading or market timing, and it did 
not share in the profits or benefits from the late trading, from 
which it received only $16.9 million in commissions.224 
Bear Stearns made a settlement offer, which the SEC accepted.225 
“Without admitting or denying the findings, Bear Stearns agreed 
to pay $160 million as ‘disgorgement’ and $90 million as a civil 
penalty.”226 Bear Stearns then sought indemnification from its 
primary carrier, Vigilant Insurance Co., and six excess carriers.227 
                                                                                                     
 221. J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076, 1083 (N.Y. 
2013). 
 222. See id. at 1078 (discussing the underlying SEC investigation of Bear 
Stearns). 
 223. See id. (providing the course of events during the SEC’s investigation). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. (providing the terms of the settlement between Bear Stearns 
and the SEC). 
 226. Id. “The agreed-upon $250 million payment was deposited in a fund to 
compensate any mutual fund investors who had been harmed by Bear Stearns’ 
conduct.” Id. 
 227. See id. at 1079 (“It requested indemnity for three claims: the $160 
million SEC disgorgement payment . . . ; $40 million in defense costs; and the 
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The insurers denied coverage for all three claims, and Bear 
Stearns commenced a breach of contract and declaratory 
judgment action.228 Bear Stearns argued “that its claims all fell 
within the definition of Loss and alleged that a substantial 
portion of the SEC disgorgement payment ($140 million) 
represented illicit profits obtained by its hedge fund customers 
rather than gains enjoyed by Bear Stearns itself.”229 The insurers 
argued “that Bear Stearns could not be indemnified for any 
portion of the SEC disgorgement payment as a matter of public 
policy.”230 The trial court denied the insurers motions to dismiss, 
but the Appellate Division reversed, dismissed the complaint, and 
held “that, as a matter of public policy, Bear Stearns could not 
seek recoupment of the $160 million disgorgement payment.”231 
In June 2013, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the 
order of the Appellate Division.232 The court rejected the insurers’ 
public policy argument that “Bear Stearns should not be entitled 
to seek indemnity for the $160 million disgorgement payment 
because Bear Stearns enabled its customers to make millions 
through its trading tactics.”233 The court explicitly stated the 
rationales that support denial of coverage for disgorgement: 
Although we have not considered the issue, other courts have 
held that the risk of being ordered to return ill-gotten gains—
disgorgement—is not insurable. Some courts reached this 
conclusion because, as a matter of contract interpretive 
principles, the return of improperly acquired funds does not 
constitute a “loss” or “damages” within the meaning of 
insurance policies [citing Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. 
Co., 272 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2001)]. Others have 
emphasized that public policy prohibits an insured from 
receiving indemnification for the disgorgement of its own illicit 
                                                                                                     
$14 million private settlement.”). 
 228. See id. at 1080 (discussing the events that led to the coverage dispute).  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. (providing the procedural history of the coverage suit). 
 232. See id. at 1083 (“[A]lthough we certainly do not condone the late 
trading and market timing activities described in the SEC order, the Insurers 
have not met their heavy burden of establishing, as a matter of law . . . , that 
Bear Stearns is barred from pursuing insurance coverage under its policies.”). 
 233. Id. at 1080. 
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gains [citing Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 555 
(Cal. 1992)].234 
Although it discussed these established principles, the court 
ultimately recognized Bear Stearns’s claim “that much of the 
payment, although labeled disgorgement by the SEC, did not 
actually represent the disgorgement of its own profits.”235 
Because the findings in the SEC order did not “conclusively link 
the disgorgement payment to improperly acquired funds in the 
hands of the insured,” the court found that the insurers were not 
entitled to dismissal of Bear Stearns’ claims related to the SEC 
disgorgement payment.236 The insurers also relied on a policy 
exclusion that essentially denied coverage for claims that 
constitute disgorgement.237 However, the court found that this 
exclusion did not defeat coverage because the SEC order did not 
conclusively refute Bear Stearns’ contention that its misconduct 
profited others and not itself.238 
J.P. Morgan Securities highlights the ambiguities 
surrounding the concept of disgorgement. It also demonstrates 
how the application of the disgorgement remedy can be difficult, 
especially when the insured claims, as Bear Stearns did, that 
only a portion of the disgorgement payment represents the 
insured’s ill-gotten profits.239 While the purpose of 
disgorgement—“to eliminate the possibility of profit from 
conscious wrongdoing”—“is easily stated and readily 
understandable,” the application of the remedy can be difficult.240 
                                                                                                     
 234. Id. at 1082. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1083. The court stated that at the summary judgment stage of 
litigation, “the documentary evidence does not decisively repudiate Bear 
Stearns’ allegation that the SEC disgorgement payment amount was calculated 
in large measure on the profits of others.” Id. 
 237. See id. (quoting the insurance policy as denying coverage for claims 
“arising out of [Bear Stearns] gaining in fact any personal profit or advantage to 
which [Bear Stearns] was not legally entitled, including but not limited to any 
actual or alleged commingling of funds or accounts”). 
 238. See id. (providing that the two policy exclusions, relied upon by the 
insurers, do not defeat coverage). 
 239. See id. at 1080 (providing that Bear Stearns “contends that it was not 
unjustly enriched by at least $140 million of the disgorgement payment because 
that portion was attributable to the profits of its customers”). 
 240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. e (2011). 
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For example, in situations such as the one in J.P. Morgan 
Securities, “the application of the disgorgement remedy turns on 
problems of attribution, as the court attempts to decide what 
portion of the defendant’s assets or income is properly 
attributable to the underlying wrong to the claimant.”241 The 
Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
provides that “the problem of attribution may involve questions 
that facts cannot answer,” such as “[w]hat proportion of the 
defendant’s overall profits to treat as the product of the 
underlying wrong.”242 As J.P. Morgan Securities demonstrates, if 
the insured can claim that only a portion of the disgorgement 
payment represents its ill-gotten profits, then it is not likely that 
the insurer will win on its motion to dismiss the insured’s claims. 
2. Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc. 
In the underlying suit leading up to the coverage dispute in 
Cohen, Canyon Ranch employees filed a class action lawsuit 
against Canyon Ranch alleging that the company had violated 
the Massachusetts Tip Act, which requires “that all moneys 
collected as a ‘service’ charge be paid directly to the company’s 
employees.”243 The lawsuit was settled for approximately $16 
million.244 The directors and officers, Cohen and Zuckerman, 
personally paid the settlement costs because the company was 
insolvent.245 Cohen and Zuckerman sought indemnification under 
their D&O policies, but the insurance companies denied coverage, 
“claiming the policies excluded coverage, or alternatively, that 
coverage for the cost of the Wood settlement was uninsurable as a 
matter of law.”246 Cohen and Zuckerman then filed suit against 
the insurance companies.247 The trial court granted summary 
                                                                                                     
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc., 308 P.3d 1196, 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 244. See id. (discussing the underlying settlement). 
 245. See id. (discussing the events leading up to the coverage dispute). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. (providing that Cohen and Zuckerman alleged breach of contract 
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
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judgment in favor of the insurers and found “that the payment to 
the Wood plaintiffs was restitutionary and that such payments 
were uninsurable as a matter of public policy.”248 
The sole issue on appeal was “whether restitutionary 
payments are potentially insurable under Arizona law or 
whether, as the trial court found, any agreement to insure such 
payments would be unenforceable because such payments are not 
‘losses,’ or are uninsurable as a matter of law.”249 This presented 
an issue of first impression in Arizona.250 The appellate court 
began its analysis by stating that the Arizona Supreme Court has 
emphasized the freedom of parties to contract251 and “warned 
that courts must therefore be hesitant to declare contractual 
provisions invalid on public policy grounds.”252 The trial court, 
rather than applying the Ocotillo test253 to determine whether 
restitutionary payments are insurable, followed the reasoning of 
extrajurisdictional case law, such as Level 3 and Bank of the 
West.254 The appellate court provided a critical analysis of the 
interpretive principle rationale and the public policy rationale.255 
First, the court addressed the Level 3 rationale that 
“restitutionary payments are not strictly losses,” but it stated 
that this rationale “does not resolve whether such coverage 
                                                                                                     
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. (“No Arizona case has squarely addressed whether losses 
incurred from unforeseen restitutionary payments are insurable.”). 
 251. See id. at 1198–99 (“Our law generally presumes . . . that private 
parties are best able to determine if particular contractual terms serve their 
interests.” (citation omitted)). 
 252. Id. at 1198 (citation omitted). In 1800 Ocotillo, L.L.C. v. WLB Group, 
Inc., the Arizona Supreme Court set forth the following test for determining 
when public policy should outweigh the contractual terms agreed upon by the 
parties: “Absent legislation specifying that a contractual term is unenforceable, 
courts should rely on public policy to displace the private ordering of 
relationships only when the term is contrary to an otherwise identifiable public 
policy that clearly outweighs any interests in the term’s enforcement.” 196 P.3d 
222, 224 (Ariz. 2008). 
 253. Supra note 252. 
 254. See Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc., 308 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013) (providing that the trial court followed the reasoning of the courts that 
have addressed whether restitutionary payments may be insurable).  
 255. See id. (“These cases all conclude that restitutionary payments may not 
be covered by insurance policies for two reasons.”). 
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should be available as a matter of public policy.”256 The possibility 
still exists that the parties could agree that the insurer would 
indemnify the insured for payments that are restitutionary in 
nature.257 Second, the court stated that the rule from Bank of the 
West258 “is categorical and would render losses from 
restitutionary payments uninsurable, regardless of the specific 
language of the agreement or the specific circumstances of the 
claim.”259 
The court was concerned that Level 3’s approach “forecloses 
consideration of variation in contractual language,” which might 
mitigate or even eliminate public policy concerns because Level 3 
and its progeny focus solely on the nature of the claim rather 
than the conduct of the insured.260 Because Arizona’s approach 
mandates “an exacting analysis of the impact of public policy on 
the enforceability of specific contractual agreements,” the court 
could not adopt the “categorical preclusion” of coverage for 
restitutionary losses.261 The court considered a hypothetical 
insurance contract that covered restitutionary payments and 
concluded that the interest in enforcing such a contract 
                                                                                                     
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. (“Hypothetically, parties could negotiate other insurance policy 
language to expressly insure business hardships arising from an unexpected 
duty to make a restitutionary payment.”). 
 258. See Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992) (“It is 
well established that one may not insure against the risk of being ordered to 
return money or property that has been wrongfully acquired.”). 
 259. Cohen, 308 P.3d at 1199. 
 260. See id. at 1200 (analyzing Level 3 and declining to adopt its rationale); 
Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2001) (“How 
the claim or judgment order or settlement is worded is irrelevant.”); CNL Hotels 
& Resorts, Inc. v. Hous. Cas. Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(“[T]he important factor in determining ‘loss’ is the restitutionary character of 
the payment at issue, not the malfeasance (or lack thereof) on the part of the 
entity making it.”); Conseco, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 
49D130202CP000348, 2002 WL 31961447, at *11 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) 
(“[A]n insured has no greater right to something wrongfully acquired by mistake 
or accident than it does to something acquired by fraud—the critical factor is 
that the money or property does not belong to the insured, and it has to be 
returned.”); Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 456 S.W.2d 489, 494 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (“The insured’s innocence and good faith are immaterial.”). 
 261. Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc., 308 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013). 
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outweighs the public policy against insuring restitutionary 
payments: 
Thus, while potential policy language could substantially 
mitigate any public policy concern arising from coverage of 
restitutionary losses, the public has a countervailing interest 
in the enforcement of insurance policies protecting well-
intentioned directors and officers from the type of unforeseen 
losses occurring here. Prohibiting such agreements altogether 
would discourage persons from acting as officers or directors of 
companies expanding to other states.262 
There are two factors that seem to be critical to the court’s 
decision. First, the policy forbidding coverage for restitutionary 
payments has never been expressed in any Arizona legislation or 
judicial decisions.263 Second, “parties to an insurance contract are 
fully capable of drafting language that prohibits coverage when 
an insured has intentionally or recklessly acquired property in a 
wrongful fashion.”264 Although the court concluded that Arizona 
public policy does not prohibit coverage for restitutionary 
payments, it did not decide whether the policies at issue covered 
the losses claimed by Cohen and Zuckerman and remanded the 
case to the trial court.265 The Cohen court declined to follow 
Level 3 and instead recognized a strong public policy in favor of 
enforcing contracts.266 The court was concerned with the intent of 
the insured, and it seemed that the court would favor coverage in 
situations when well-intentioned insureds suffer unforeseen 
losses that might be restitutionary in nature.267 
                                                                                                     
 262. Id. 
 263. See id. (“The policy forbidding insurance coverage for restitutionary 
payments in Arizona is not strong.”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See id. (concluding that “the trial court erred when it determined as a 
matter of law that Arizona law prohibits insurance coverage for restitutionary 
payments” and remanding “for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion”). 
 266. See supra note 251 (providing that the Arizona Supreme Court has 
emphasized the freedom of parties to contract for terms that best serve their 
interests). 
 267. See Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc., 308 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013) (“Thus, while potential policy language could substantially mitigate any 
public policy concern arising from coverage of restitutionary losses, the public 
has a countervailing interest in the enforcement of insurance policies protecting 
well-intentioned directors and officers from the type of unforeseen losses 
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3. Fidelity Bank v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co. 
In Fidelity Bank v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co., Fidelity 
Bank purchased a “Management and Professional Liability for 
Financial Institutions policy” from Chartis Specialty Insurance 
Company.268 Fidelity Bank’s customers sued the Bank in a class 
action lawsuit alleging, “the fee that Plaintiff charged its 
customers for overdrafts amounted to a usurious interest charge 
in violation of Georgia law.”269 The Bank settled the underlying 
class action suit and brought suit against its insurer, Chartis, 
claiming that Chartis “has a duty to indemnify Plaintiff for the 
sums that it lost as a result of the suit.”270 Chartis argued that it 
was not obligated to indemnify the Bank for several reasons. The 
two relevant arguments were that “the amounts that Fidelity 
paid to settle the Underlying Action are uninsurable as a matter 
of law because they amount to restitution,” and that “the Policy 
excludes claims arising out of disputes over fees.”271 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
found the insurer’s arguments “compelling.”272 The court 
reasoned that the damages claimed by the underlying plaintiffs 
did not amount to money that the Bank lost because the Bank 
was using “funds from its customers’ accounts in a manner that 
was not legally authorized.”273 Therefore, the Bank was required 
to return its customers’ funds, which the court characterized as 
“restitution for amounts Plaintiff collected pursuant to illegal 
practices.”274 Although the court could not locate Georgia case law 
that addressed the issue of insurance coverage for restitution, it 
used the same line of reasoning as Bank of the West.275 However, 
                                                                                                     
occurring here.”). 
 268. See Fid. Bank v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., No. 1:12-CV-4259-RWS, 
2013 WL 4039414, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2013) (discussing the factual 
background of the case). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at *3. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. (providing that if the court found coverage, “it would amount to 
a ruling that Plaintiff is free to collect fees and make profits from its customers 
through illegal conduct, and the insurer is on the hook when the customers sue 
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the court declined to adopt this rationale stating, “this Court 
hesitates to purport to announce a ‘new’ Georgia rule.”276 The 
court avoided expressing its position on insurance coverage for 
restitution and disgorgement because it was able to conclude that 
there was no coverage based upon a policy exclusion.277 The fact 
that the court brings up this “rule” from courts in several states 
but then declines to either adopt or reject it demonstrates the 
uncertainty and inconsistency among courts when addressing the 
issue of insurance coverage for restitutionary payments, 
especially when the issue is one of first impression. 
4. William Beaumont Hospital v. Federal Insurance Co. 
In the underlying suit in William Beaumont Hospital v. 
Federal Insurance Co., two nurses instituted a class action 
against eight Detroit-area hospital systems, including William 
Beaumont Hospital,278 alleging that the hospitals had violated 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.279 The class action plaintiffs “sought 
to recover for the compensation properly earned by [registered 
nurses] employed at Detroit-area hospitals but unlawfully 
retained by such hospitals.”280 William Beaumont Hospital sued 
its insurer, Federal, seeking a declaration that Federal was 
obligated to indemnify the hospital.281 Federal argued that “the 
settlement constituted disgorgement and was not considered a 
Loss under the Policy and thus was uninsurable.”282 
The policy limited the definition of loss, which explicitly 
carved out “disgorgement.”283 Federal argued that the nurses’ 
                                                                                                     
while Plaintiff keeps the ill-gotten gains”). 
 276. Id. at *4. 
 277. See id. (finding that Exclusion (h) “speaks to exactly this type of claim” 
because it “excludes from indemnification (but not defense) disputes involving 
fees and commissions”). 
 278. See William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13-1468, 2014 WL 
185388, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014) (discussing the facts of the underlying suit 
brought against William Beaumont Hospital and seven other hospitals). 
 279. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 280. William Beaumont Hosp., 2014 WL 185388, at *2. 
 281. See id. (discussing the coverage dispute). 
 282. Id. 
 283. See William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 11-15528, 2013 WL 
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claims fell within this policy exclusion because “the advantage 
gained was nursing services at below-market compensation and 
that settlement is clearly disgorgement of the value of that 
advantage.”284 The Sixth Circuit rejected Federal’s argument 
stating, “[t]his is a classic compensatory damages calculation—it 
attempts to put the nurses in the position they would have been if 
not for the violation.”285 The court provided a definition of the 
word “disgorge” from the dictionary: “disgorge means to give up 
illicit or ill-gotten gains.”286 After defining each word used in the 
definition of “disgorge,” the court reasoned that “Beaumont 
retained the due, but unpaid, wages unlawfully,” but Beaumont 
“never gained possession of (or obtained or acquired) the nurses’ 
wages illicitly, unlawfully, or unjustly.”287 According to the court, 
because the hospital never gained possession of the nurses’ wages 
illicitly, but merely retained them illicitly, the money paid in 
settlement was not “disgorgement.”288 This analysis is 
unresponsive to the insurer’s disgorgement argument because it 
simply made a verbal distinction between the words “retain” and 
“obtain.”289 William Beaumont demonstrates how amorphous the 
term “disgorgement” can be, especially in the hands of skilled 
lawyers who are able to make arguments that exploit the 
ambiguities surrounding the meaning of the term. 
                                                                                                     
992552, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2013) (quoting the insurance policy as 
providing that “any Claim based upon, arising from or in consequence of profit, 
remuneration or advantage to which an Insured was not legally entitled, the 
term Loss . . . shall not include disgorgement by any Insured” (emphasis added)). 
 284. William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13-1468, 2014 WL 
185388, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014). 
 285. Id. at *5. 
 286. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). 
 287. Id. at *5. 
 288. See id. (“The hospital could not have taken money from the nurses 
because it was never in their hands in the first place.”). 
 289. See id. (“[W]e find the hospital never gained possession of (or obtained 
or acquired) the nurses’ wages illicitly, unlawfully, or unjustly. Rather, 
according to the nurses’ complaint, Beaumont retained the due, but unpaid, 
wages unlawfully. This is not mere semantics. Retaining or withholding differs 
from obtaining or acquiring.”). 
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5. Where Does This Leave Us? 
The former chairman of the SEC, William Donaldson, 
“described the issues relating to the insurability of disgorgement 
as ‘complicated’ and said it is up to the courts to determine as a 
matter of state law whether they are insurable.”290 It is clear that 
the courts have struggled, and continue to struggle, with these 
issues. Sometimes the difficulty in determining coverage for 
amounts labeled as disgorgement “lies in the distinction between 
‘disgorgements’ that actually represent compensatory damages 
and payments that truly are the return of ill-gotten gains.”291 “In 
determining whether a ‘disgorgement’ will be insurable, one must 
look beyond the label placed on the payment to the substance and 
facts forming its basis.”292 In sum, courts must look at the nature 
of the claim or payment to see if it constitutes restitution or 
disgorgement.293 However, this task has proven difficult because 
specific, universal definitions of these terms do not exist to serve 
as guideposts for courts.294 This is where the Third Restatement 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment comes in. 
IV. What Do We Do About It? 
Utilizing the definitions in the Third Restatement of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment will aid in the development of 
specific, clear definitions of the terms “restitution” and 
“disgorgement.”295 Having clear definitions of these terms in the 
                                                                                                     
 290. See RICHARD A. ROSEN, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN COMMERCIAL 
DISPUTES: NEGOTIATING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCEMENT § 34.15 (2013) (citing 
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Global Research 
Analyst Settlement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (May 7, 2003)). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See supra note 260 (discussing cases that focus on the nature of the 
claim). 
 294. See Kull, supra note 121, at 1194–95 (“[I]n the area of liability for 
unjust enrichment . . . this threshold task of definition was not pursued to a 
conclusion . . . . The result has been a persistent uncertainty about this part of 
the law that continues to hamper analysis and even comprehension.”). 
 295. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
(2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject 
COVERAGE FOR ILL-GOTTEN GAINS? 1127 
insurance context will help reduce and, in some cases, avoid 
litigation. Currently, the precedent for the courts regarding 
whether restitutionary payments are insurable is unclear.296 
Because courts vary in their approaches to this issue,297 courts 
that have not yet addressed this issue do not have a clear rule to 
follow. Although some courts adopt the rule from Level 3298 or the 
public policy approach from Bank of the West,299 other courts 
decline to adopt either and devise their own approach for 
addressing this issue.300 
Because the approaches among the courts vary and are 
rarely consistent with one another, litigants cannot readily 
predict the likely result of their case. Therefore, litigants may be 
unsure whether they should expend large amounts of money 
challenging the insurance company’s denial of coverage for 
payments that may or may not be restitutionary in nature. More 
broadly, it is important for insureds to understand what their 
insurance policies cover. Having clear definitions of restitution 
and disgorgement will help insureds predict, with some degree of 
certainty, whether a certain payment or claim will be covered and 
will help them avoid potentially devastating economic 
consequences.301 
                                                                                                     
to liability in restitution.”); id. § 51(4) (“The object of restitution in such cases is 
to eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the 
imposition of a penalty. Restitution remedies that pursue this object are often 
called disgorgement or accounting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 296. See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text (providing two 
rationales that courts have used to reach the conclusion that restitutionary 
payments or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains are uninsurable). 
 297. See supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text (discussing the 
different ways that courts interpret a policy’s terms to determine whether an 
insurer has to cover restitutionary payments made by an insured); supra Part 
III.D (discussing recent cases that take various approaches in determining 
whether restitution and disgorgement are insurable). 
 298. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing cases that have followed Level 3’s 
rationale to deny coverage for restitution or disgorgement). 
 299. See supra Part III.C (discussing cases that have followed the public 
policy rationale to deny coverage for payments or claims that are restitutionary 
in nature). 
 300. See supra Part III.D.2 (providing a discussion of Cohen v. Lovitt & 
Touche, Inc., in which the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to follow Level 3 or 
Bank of the West and concluded that Arizona public policy does not prohibit 
coverage for restitutionary payments). 
 301. See Eric W. Collins, Note, Level 3 v. Federal Insurance: Do You Know 
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A blanket rule prohibiting coverage for restitution and 
disgorgement is inappropriate because facts and circumstances of 
cases vary, and insurers and insureds are free to contract for 
coverage of restitutionary payments.302 Therefore, the application 
of the rule prohibiting coverage for restitution and disgorgement 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis. This approach is 
consistent with the fact that insurance law disputes are typically 
resolved on a case-by-case basis.303 The following suggested 
solutions are intended to provide clarity and guidance in 
determining whether restitution and disgorgement should be 
insurable. 
A. Suggested Solutions 
1. The Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
First, courts should employ the principles of contract 
interpretation in light of the Third Restatement of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment. The Third Restatement clarifies the 
meanings of “restitution” and “disgorgement.”304 Because the 
                                                                                                     
What Is In Your Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy?, 73 UMKC L. 
REV. 199, 212 (2004) (“Allowing insurance companies to avoid their coverage 
responsibility as they see fit opens the door to potentially devastating economic 
consequences. After companies have paid the steep cost of insurance premiums, 
they do not receive the benefit that the payment of those premiums was 
‘guaranteed’ to provide.”). 
 302. See supra note 257 (providing an example of a situation in which an 
insurer might agree to indemnify the insured for payments that are 
restitutionary in nature). 
 303. See James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is 
Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 176 (1998) 
(“[A]ny approach we may develop, which attempts to balance the interests of the 
policyholder and the carrier will introduce uncertainty into insurance law due to 
the prevalence of case-by-case determination to resolve ambiguity and achieve 
expectations, which are largely individualistic and context specific.”); John K. 
DiMugno, The Shifting Tides of Insurance Policy Interpretation: Does McKinnon 
v. Truck Insurance Exchange Change How Courts Will Interpret Insurance 
Policies?, 15 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 215, 215 n.2 (2003) (“Drafting policy 
elaborate provisions to address [the vast] circumstances would be extremely 
difficult; so, rather than attempt to deal with these matters, the insurance 
industry has simply punted, opting to deal with these matters on a case by case 
basis.”). 
 304. See supra note 295 (providing the meanings of restitution and 
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Third Restatement provides clear definitions, courts can easily 
apply its principles on a case-by-case basis. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding the terminology of restitution, the courts, and even 
lawyers, could benefit themselves and litigants by utilizing and 
adopting the definitions and principles from the Third 
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 and 
§ 51.305 These sections, along with the comments following each 
section, not only provide clear definitions of these terms but also 
provide a clear picture as to where restitution fits within the 
realm of damages and where restitution and disgorgement fall on 
the spectrum of remedies.306 Having a clear definition and 
understanding of these terms is critical for coverage disputes in 
which courts have to determine whether there is coverage for 
claims or payments that were labeled as restitution or 
disgorgement in the underlying suit or settlement.307 Although 
labeled as such, the claim or payment may not actually be 
restitutionary in nature.308 Therefore, courts must have a sound 
understanding of the meanings of these terms before deciding 
whether there is coverage or not. Using the principles of contract 
interpretation in conjunction with the Third Restatement will 
allow courts to effectively decide coverage disputes on a case-by-
case basis instead of relying upon the nebulous public policy 
rationale to deny coverage for restitutionary payments. 
                                                                                                     
disgorgement under §§ 1 and 51 of the Third Restatement of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment). 
 305. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
(2011) (restitution and unjust enrichment); id. § 51 (enrichment by misconduct, 
disgorgement, and accounting). 
 306. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
meaning of “disgorgement” and providing that disgorgement can be 
conceptualized as falling under the label of “restitution”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a (2011) (“Liability in 
restitution derives from the receipt of a benefit whose retention without 
payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense 
of the claimant.”); id. § 51 cmt. k (providing that “[d]isgorgement of wrongful 
gain is not a punitive remedy”). 
 307. See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076, 1082–83 
(N.Y. 2013) (analyzing the nature of the payment at issue despite the fact that 
the payment was labeled “disgorgement” by the SEC). 
 308. See id. at 1082 (concluding that the insurers are not entitled to 
dismissal of the insured’s coverage claim because the insured argued that “much 
of the payment . . . did not actually represent the disgorgement of its own 
profits” even though it was labeled “disgorgement” by the SEC). 
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2. Abandoning the Public Policy Rationale 
Second, the public policy rationale should be abandoned or, 
at least, should be subject to a more exacting analysis when used 
by insurance companies to disclaim coverage for restitutionary 
payments. Both the Arizona Court of Appeals in Cohen and the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in William Beaumont Hospital 
disgorged the insurers of this overused defense that is not based 
on exclusions in an insurance policy. In Cohen, the Arizona Court 
of Appeals found that the public policy rationale—that “one may 
not insure against the risk of being ordered to return money or 
property that has been wrongfully acquired”309—is “categorical” 
and “forecloses consideration of variation in contractual language 
which could substantially mitigate or even eliminate any public 
policy concerns.”310 The court concluded that Arizona’s approach 
to public policy, which mandates “an exacting analysis of the 
impact of public policy on the enforceability of specific contractual 
agreements,” could not be harmonized with “the categorical 
preclusion of insurance for restitutionary losses.”311 The Arizona 
Court of Appeals did not accept the “categorical rule” from Bank 
of the West but engaged in a thoughtful public policy analysis to 
determine whether Arizona law prohibited insurance coverage for 
restitutionary payments.312 
Similarly, in William Beaumont Hospital, the Sixth Circuit 
did not accept the insurer’s argument that coverage is contrary to 
Michigan’s public policy because “no one should benefit from his 
own wrongdoing.”313 The Sixth Circuit recognized that under the 
Michigan cases, “the doctrine that an insured may not profit from 
its own wrongdoing relates to intentional tortious or criminal 
                                                                                                     
 309. Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992). 
 310. Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc., 308 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 311. Id. 
 312. See id. (providing that Arizona’s approach required the court “to 
(1) presume that private parties are best able to determine if particular 
contractual terms serve their interests and, (2) in light of that presumption, 
weigh the particular beneficial features of a proposed agreement against any 
public policy concerns raised by it” (citation omitted)). 
 313. William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13-1468, 2014 WL 
185388, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014). 
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acts.”314 Because the insurer did not identify “any cases in the 
Sixth Circuit holding that disgorgement is not insurable,” the 
court found that the insurer’s public policy claim failed.315 Public 
policy belongs in the hands of legislators, not courts.316 Therefore, 
a third potential solution is a legislative approach to the issue of 
whether restitution and disgorgement are insurable. 
3. A Legislative Approach 
Just as some state legislatures have passed laws addressing 
the insurability of punitive damages317 and willful acts,318 state 
legislatures could propose legislation addressing the insurability 
of restitution and disgorgement. The legislation should clearly 
define the terms “restitution” and “disgorgement” and should be 
precise about what is insurable and what is not insurable.319 
However, without legislation, the courts must decide whether 
restitutionary payments and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains 
are insurable. Courts have struggled with this issue because the 
terms restitution and disgorgement are subject to 
                                                                                                     
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at *7–8. 
 316. See Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. 
1992) (“When the contract language is clear, . . . exceptions based on public 
policy must usually find support in necessary implication from statutory 
provisions.” (citation omitted)); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 
1006, 1008 (Pa. 1998) (“In the absence of a plain indication of that policy 
through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of 
obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare 
contracts . . . contrary to public policy. The courts must be content to await 
legislative action.” (citation omitted)); Cary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 922 P.2d 1335, 
1338 (Wash. 1996) (“Public policy is generally determined by the Legislature 
and established through statutory provisions.”). 
 317. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing legislation 
passed in Virginia, Kansas, and South Carolina regarding the insurability of 
punitive damages). 
 318. See Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 154 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998) (“Section 533 [of the California Insurance Code] precludes insurance 
coverage for a ‘wilful act.’ The purpose of such a prohibition is obviously to 
discourage wilful torts. . . . It is an implied exclusionary clause which, by 
statute, must be read into all insurance policies.” (citations omitted)). 
 319. See, e.g., supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (discussing statutes 
that explicitly provide what is insurable and what is uninsurable as a matter of 
law). 
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misunderstanding.320 Utilizing the Third Restatement of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment and adopting its definitions 
could prove to be a successful first step toward resolving the 
issues surrounding insurance coverage for restitutionary 
payments.321 
4. Insurance Policy Exclusions for Restitution and Disgorgement 
Fourth, insurance companies could include explicit provisions 
in liability policies that address coverage or non-coverage for 
restitutionary payments or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 
Typically, insurers rely on the limitation provided in the 
definition of loss—that loss does not include matters uninsurable 
under applicable law322—to argue that the state’s public policy 
prohibits coverage for restitutionary payments or disgorgement of 
ill-gotten gains.323 Instead of relying on this general language, 
insurance companies could either define loss to exclude 
restitution and disgorgement, or they could provide explicit 
exclusions in the exclusions section of the policy.324 However, if 
insurers do provide such exclusions, the policy should also 
provide definitions of restitution and disgorgement in order to 
provide clarity and hopefully limit litigation.325 
                                                                                                     
 320. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 977 (“Professional misunderstanding 
of restitution exacerbates the difficulties of developing boundaries.”). 
 321. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (stating the meanings of 
restitution and disgorgement as provided by §§ 1 and 51 of the Third 
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment). 
 322. See Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (D. Mass. 
2009) (quoting the insurance policy as providing that the term “loss” does not 
include “matters uninsurable under the law pursuant to which [the insurance 
policy] is construed”). 
 323. See id. at 288 (“Second, [the insurance company] contends that even if 
the Settlement Payment might fall within the commonly understood meaning of 
the word ‘loss,’ the Payment is uninsurable under Massachusetts law for 
reasons of public policy.”). 
 324. See supra note 130 (discussing insurance policy provisions that have 
limited the definition of “loss” as to exclude restitution or disgorgement). 
 325. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text (providing that the 
failure to define “damages,” “judgments,” and “settlements,” each of which is 
included in the definition of loss, has led to issues in coverage litigation 
regarding what is covered under the insurance policy). 
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William Beaumont Hospital demonstrates why insurers need 
to provide clear definitions of restitution and disgorgement if they 
are excluded from coverage and why such exclusions may not 
prove to be helpful.326 The insurance policy explicitly carved out 
“disgorgement” from the definition of “loss.”327 This policy 
provision did not prohibit coverage because the court found that 
the claims were for compensatory damages.328 The court rejected 
the insurer’s argument that the settlement did not constitute a 
loss stating that “Federal’s arguments, which use the terms 
restitution and disgorgement interchangeably, even though the 
Policy speaks only in terms of disgorgement, are unpersuasive.”329 
The court also emphasized that “Federal used the term 
restitution elsewhere in the Policy, so it should be aware of the 
difference between the two terms.”330 If insurance companies 
want to explicitly exclude coverage for restitutionary payments or 
disgorgement, then insurers must expressly define these terms in 
the policy, especially if the policy language contains both terms. 
The policy exclusion in J.P. Morgan Securities did not prove 
to be effective, at least at the summary judgment phase of 
litigation.331 The exclusion essentially denied coverage for claims 
that constitute disgorgement.332 However, this exclusion did not 
defeat coverage because Bear Stearns argued that “its misconduct 
profited others, not itself.”333 The policy exclusion in Cohen was 
very similar to the policy exclusion in J.P. Morgan Securities.334 
                                                                                                     
 326. See supra notes 283–289 and accompanying text (discussing the 
definition of loss, which excluded disgorgement, and providing why the Sixth 
Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument that relied on this exclusionary clause). 
 327. See supra note 283 (providing the policy definition of loss, which 
excluded “disgorgement”). 
 328. See William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13-1468, 2014 WL 
185388, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014) (“[T]he calculation of the settlement itself 
indicates that the nurses were seeking purely compensatory damages.”). 
 329. Id. at *4. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See supra notes 237–238 and accompanying text (discussing the policy 
exclusion in J.P. Morgan Securities and why the exclusion did not defeat 
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 334. See Cohen v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. C20092552, 2011 WL 8780709, at 
1134 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1077 (2015) 
Despite the existence of this exclusion, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals did not address whether this exclusion prohibited 
coverage because it concluded “the trial court erred when it 
determined as a matter of law that Arizona law prohibits 
insurance coverage for restitutionary payments” and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.335 
As J.P. Morgan Securities and Cohen demonstrate, it is 
possible that such exclusions will not effectively bar coverage for 
restitution and disgorgement.336 These exclusions could also 
prove to be problematic if restitution and disgorgement are 
defined too broadly or too narrowly.337 However, there is much to 
be said about a carefully drafted policy. If insurers are precise 
when drafting these exclusions and provide specific definitions of 
restitution and disgorgement, then it would be easier for courts to 
resolve these disputes.338 Policyholders that are sophisticated 
businesspersons or entities will also benefit from specific 
exclusions because such exclusions will put insureds on notice 
that their coverage is limited.339 However, policy exclusions for 
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restitution and disgorgement certainly are not the final answer to 
the problem. 
V. Conclusion 
The uncertainty surrounding coverage for restitutionary 
payments, especially disgorgement, has implications for insureds 
as well as insurers. Insureds pay high premiums for insurance 
coverage, but their claims for indemnification have a good chance 
of getting denied if they are labeled disgorgement or restitution. 
However, as recent decisions have indicated, courts are placing 
the public policy rationale under greater scrutiny and might even 
be moving away from accepting this rationale as a blanket bar 
against coverage for restitutionary payments. Both J.P. Morgan 
Securities and Cohen serve as a victory for insureds by narrowing 
the insurer’s ability to rely on the public policy rationale and by 
reducing the ability of insurers to deny coverage merely because a 
claim or payment is labeled disgorgement or restitution. 
However, it is important to remember that the object of 
disgorgement is “to strip the defendant of a wrongful gain.”340 If 
an insured can pass off liability for disgorgement to its insurer, 
then the problem of moral hazard arises. The insured will believe 
that it can profit from its own wrongdoing by retaining its ill-
gotten profits because the insurer will provide coverage for the 
insured’s disgorgement. This is not a just result and has serious 
implications for insurers. To prevent insureds from profiting from 
their own ill-gotten gains, courts must have a strong 
understanding of the meaning of disgorgement so that coverage 
can be denied for claims that seek to disgorge the insured’s ill-
gotten profits. The Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment will help courts and lawyers gain a sound 
understanding of restitution and disgorgement not only through 
its definitions but also through the comments, which provide 
further explanation of these two remedies and the potential 
issues relating to their application. 
                                                                                                     
 340. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. a (2011). 
